# 1nc

### 1

#### Interp and violation- “targeted killing” requires specific intel-based targets- this excludes signature strikes

**Anderson ’11** [Kenneth, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University; and Hoover Institution visiting fellow, member of Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law; nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution, “Distinguishing High Value Targeted Killing and “Signature” Attacks on Taliban Fighters,” August 29, <http://www.volokh.com/2011/08/29/distinguishing-high-value-targeted-killing-and-signature-attacks-on-taliban-fighters/>]

Another way to put this is that, loosely speaking, the high value targets are part of a counterterrorism campaign – a worldwide one, reaching these days to Yemen and other places. It is targeted killing in its strict sense using drones – aimed at a distinct individual who has been identified by intelligence. The “signature” strikes, by contrast, are not strictly speaking “targeted killing,” because they are aimed at larger numbers of fighters who are targeted on the basis of being combatants, but not on the basis of individuated intelligence. They are fighting formations, being targeted on a mass basis as part of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, as part of the basic CI doctrine of closing down cross-border safe havens and border interdiction of fighters. Both of these functions can be, and are, carried out by drones – though each strategic function could be carried out by other means, such as SEAL 6 or CIA human teams, in the case of targeted killing, or manned aircraft in the case of attacks on Taliban formations. The fundamental point is that they serve distinct strategic purposes. Targeted killing is not synonymous with drone warfare, just as counterterrorism is analytically distinct from counterinsurgency. (I discuss this in the opening sections of this draft chapter on SSRN.)

#### It’s a voter

#### Limits- explodes the topic to allow any sort of non-targeted killing- makes it impossible to predict and gives the aff unfair leeway on an already aff-biased topic

#### Precision- clear definitions of war powers is especially critical on a legal topic, shapes our understanding of nuanced warfighting policies and is key to topic education

### 2

#### Immigration reform will pass now – tons of momentum and the GOP is getting on board but capital is key to a compromise

Hawkings 1/15/14 (David, Roll Call, Hawkings Here, "This Year's Legislative Acid Test: Immigration Rewrite")

And if the 2014 legislative effort comes up empty, it will reaffirm not only the president’s significantly shrunken legislative sway, but also the GOP’s interest in cultivating its most conservative fringes at the expense of all else.¶ Framed in those stark terms, it should be tough to predict that impasse is the likely outcome. That’s why advocates of a big bill, not only in the Hispanic community but also in the business world, are stoking every inkling of momentum.¶ All the attention remains, of course, on the House Republican leadership. It’s been there now for seven months, [since 68 senators voted for a measure](http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/immigration-overhaul-passes-senate/) combining a staggering border security beef-up with creation of a 13-year pathway to citizenship for the 11.5 million immigrants in the United States illegally.¶ The GOP leaders all want to put this issue behind them as quickly as practical — to get their party on the right side of demographic history before the nation’s fastest-growing ethnic group altogether abandons Republicans for a generation. (Mitt Romney took 27 percent of the Hispanic presidential vote last time, so there is still room for further decline.)¶ Word is that Speaker John A. Boehner, his three top leadership deputies and Judiciary Chairman Robert W. Goodlatte of Virginia will unveil a set of [vaguely worded policy goals](http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/boehner-says-gop-immigration-principles-to-be-released-soon/) for any bill during the next fortnight. The goal is two-fold: To signal, in advance of Obama’s State of the Union address, that their team is still interested in getting a bill, and to gauge how many in their own caucus are willing to at least keep an open mind on the matter.¶ The timing will then put the onus on the president to somehow respond in his speech. Obama and his aides are sending unmistakable signs that this year’s address will propose dead-on-arrival legislation designed to appeal to his party’s populist base during the campaign season while [he advances his agenda](http://www.rollcall.com/news/white_house_looks_past_congress_for_its_agenda-229990-1.html) almost entirely through regulations and public advocacy.¶ But “the pen, the phone and the podium,” to use the White House’s phrase, are not sufficient to change immigration policy. A jumpstart to that effort would come from Obama telling Congress on Jan. 28 how he is ready to compromise.¶ Ultimately, any deal would turn on the citizenship issue. Only if it gets resolved will there be any drive to solve disagreements about border security, the treatment of guest workers and increasing the number of visas for the highly skilled — or to decide if all immigration matters should be rolled into one bill or handled piecemeal.¶ Obama would need to back away from his desire to make a course toward citizenship as generous as the Senate’s, and then convince plenty of House Democrats to do the same in the name of partially solving a problem that would otherwise fester for years to come. House GOP leaders would need to persuade a few dozen of their own (a majority of the majority appearing out of the question) to abandon the position that any such pathway amounts to “amnesty” or “special treatment.”¶ And then at least 60 senators would need to acquiesce in whatever compromise was passed by the House.¶ The boundaries of this middle ground are getting clear to see. They are very close to what some House GOP leaders are talking about. And, according to a report this week from the National Foundation for American Policy, the result means about half the total number of current illegal residents would eventually get on a path to citizenship.¶ Goodlatte is now open to giving illegal immigrants provisional legal status, then permitting those with longstanding employment or with children or spouses who are citizens to seek a “green card” through existing channels. A green card means permanent legal residency and comes with its own timetable for becoming a citizen, usually within five years.¶ The nonpartisan research group’s study estimates 3.5 million to 5 million people could benefit from this approach, as would another 800,000 to 1.5 million if the law is changed to provide green cards to younger undocumented immigrants who arrived as children — the group now known as Dreamers.

#### The plan reverses these dynamics—sparks an inter-branch fight derailing the agenda

Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 67-69

Raising or Lowering Political Costs by Affecting Presidential Political Capital

Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction—particularly congressional opposition—to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that **costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms**. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"—Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur—explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand—yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea."

While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. **Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races." Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War.6°

In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's **highest second-term domestic priorities**, such as Social Security and immigration reform, **failed** perhaps in large part **because the administration had to expend so much energy** and effort **waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics** of the war in Iraq.

When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If **congressional opposition in the military arena stands to** derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena

#### Capital’s key but limited – the plan disrupts Obama’s careful strategy

Eilperin and Tumulty 12/10 (Juliet, House of Representatives reporter for Washington Post, and Karen, national political correspondent for The Washington Post, “Podesta, Schiliro to return to White House,”<http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/podesta-schiliro-to-return-to-white-house/2013/12/10/194b22f4-61a7-11e3-94ad-004fefa61ee6_story.html>)

President Obama is embarking on his biggest organizational overhaul of the White House since 2010, bringing in Washington veterans and rethinking the way he approaches some of the most pressing policy decisions he will make during the remainder of his second term. The decision to enlist influential Democratic strategist John D. Podesta, just days after bringing back his former legislative affairs chief Phil Schiliro, signals a larger shift in how the White House will operate in coming months. Eager to salvage his landmark health-care law and advance climate-change policy before he leaves office, Obama and his aides are open to empowering a handful of advisers with broader policy portfolios to ensure the administration achieves its goals. The president and his aides have been discussing a possible reorganization with some trusted outside advisers for at least a month, according to a senior White House official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the topic’s sensitive nature. The staff ­changes will continue in the coming weeks, the official said. The moves mark a recognition by the White House that it needed to change its operations in light of the botched Oct. 1 rollout of the health-care law, particularly given that Pete Rouse, the president’s longest-serving aide, will be leaving by the end of the year. Obama has been hesitant to replace many within his small inner circle operating in the West Wing, in part because his limited time in Washington before the presidency left him with relatively few trusted advisers. While he replaced several key members of his Cabinet after his 2012 re­election — including his secretaries of state, Treasury and defense — it is a measure of how static White House staff has been that the recruitment of two former advisers, on a temporary basis, amounts to a staff shake-up. “Obama still has an opportunity to get one or two major initiatives through Congress, possibly immigration reform, but he doesn’t have much gas left in the tank,” New York University public affairs professor Paul C. Light wrote in an e-mail. “Podesta and Schiliro may be able to ration Obama’s declining political capital, and hold the line on House Republican attacks. The door is closing on Obama’s presidency — these two advisers know how to do it as well as it can be done.” The White House’s handling of the health-care law’s implementation, Obama’s lack of knowledge about the scope of the National Security Agency’s eavesdropping program and other missteps have damaged the president’s credibility and raised questions about the West Wing’s competence. Republican critics and Democratic allies have called on Obama to fire at least one senior staff member, a step Obama has so far resisted. Podesta has done multiple stints on Capitol Hill and served twice in the Clinton White House, taking over as chief of staff in 1998 and steering the ship through Clinton’s House impeachment. After Clinton left office, Podesta founded the Center for American Progress (CAP), a liberal think tank, and managed Obama’s transition team in 2008. Obama officials emphasized that the two recent hires were distinct: Schiliro will serve only for a few months and is focused exclusively on steering the administration’s health-care policy. But the moves, along with Rouse’s imminent departure, mark one of the most significant shifts in White House staffing since the ­changes Obama made in the wake of Democratic losses in the 2010 midterms. After that election, senior aides David Axelrod, Jim Messina and Mona Sutphen left and the political director’s job occupied by Patrick Gaspard was eliminated. Obama political strategist David Plouffe came on as a senior adviser, and William Daley took over as chief of staff. Former White House deputy senior adviser Stephanie Cutter, now a partner at the consulting firm Precision Strategies, wrote in an e-mail that adding the two advisers “brings some fresh thinking and brain power, because they haven’t been in the foxhole these last several months or even years.” “They also bring institutional knowledge of the workings of the West Wing” and other parts of Washington, she added. Several former administration officials and Obama supporters said the realignment amounts to an acknowledgment that the current policy and legislative affairs operations have key vulnerabilities. The president felt the need to quiet “the chattering classes” who have suggested his team needs “more inside Washington experience,” the senior White House aide said. One former White House official, who asked for anonymity in order to speak frankly, said the ­changes reflect a recognition that the White House’s insular leadership was no longer capable of managing the administration’s myriad problems. Much of the key decision making rests with White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough, Rouse and senior adviser Valerie Jarrett. Several White House officials said recruiting Podesta was McDonough’s idea. Schiliro will be focused on bolstering the administration’s relationship with lawmakers who are nervous about the health-care law’s impact and head off any further problems with the law’s implementation. The decision to bring in Podesta reflects the president’s intent to exercise his executive authority on several key fronts. White House communications director Jennifer Palmieri said Podesta will help the administration strategize about “how do you leverage all the resources you have in the federal government to advance your agenda in a political year.” In an interview with The Washington Post this fall, Podesta said Obama’s “path to success is going to come through every single place that you can squeeze some authority which he has. That is where you’ve got to focus your attention and where you could spend your political capital.”

#### Solves US-India relations --- builds trade relationships

LA Times 12, 11/9/2012 (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China."¶ There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US/India relations are key to prevent South Asian nuclear war

Schaffer 2, Spring 2002 (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a

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#### AUMF strong now- Congress supports a broad interpretation

Brooks, 13 -- Georgetown University law professor

[Rosa, New America Foundation Schwartz senior fellow, served as a counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy from 2009 to 2011 and previously served as a senior advisor at the U.S. State Department, "Mission Creep in the War on Terror," Foreign Policy, 3-14-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/14/mission\_creep\_in\_the\_war\_on\_terror, accessed 8-24-13, mss]

"When you're not near the girl you love, love the girl you're near," sang Frank Sinatra. The U.S. government seems to have its own variant: When you're not near the terrorist you're supposed to target, target the terrorist you're near. To accommodate this desire, both the Bush and Obama administrations have had to gradually stretch the AUMF's language to accommodate an ever-widening range of potential targets, ever more attenuated from the 9/11 perpetrators. The shift has been subtle, and for the most part **Congress** has **aided and abetted it**. In the 2006 and 2009 Military Commissions Acts, for instance, Congress gave military commissions jurisdiction over individuals who are "part of forces associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban," along with "those who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners." This allowed the Bush and then the Obama administration to argue that in the original 2001 AUMF, Congress must have implicitly authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and Taliban "associated forces." That is, if Congress considers it appropriate for U.S. military commissions to have jurisdiction over al Qaeda and Taliban associates, Congress must believe the executive branch has the authority to detain such associates, and the authority to detain must stem from the authority to use force. This suggests that Congress must believe the AUMF should be read in the context of traditional law-of-war authorities, which include the implied authority to use force against (or detain) both the declared enemy and the enemy's "co-belligerents" or "associated forces." By 2009, the Obama administration was arguing in court that, at least when it comes to detention, the AUMF implicitly authorizes the president "to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners" (my emphasis). Note how far this has shifted from the original language of the AUMF: The focus is no longer merely on those who were directly complicit in the 9/11 attacks, but on a far broader category of individuals. This broadened understanding of executive detention authority was later given the congressional nod in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which used virtually identical language.

#### Executive drone strike authority is authorized by AUMF

Crowley, 12 -- TIME Washington bureau chief and senior correspondent

[Michael, previously covered foreign policy for The New Republic, "Revisiting a Key Legal Basis for Obama’s Anti-Terrorism Drone Strikes," 6-12-12, swampland.time.com/2012/06/12/revisiting-a-key-legal-basis-for-obamas-anti-terror-drone-strikes/, accessed 9-23-13, mss]

Revisiting a Key Legal Basis for Obama’s Anti-Terrorism Drone Strikes

After I wrote a short piece for last week’s magazine that, among other things, chastised the Obama Administration for not doing more to discuss the pros and cons of its heavy reliance on drone strikes against suspected terrorists, an Administration official groused that I hadn’t credited public comments on the subject by various Obama officials. He specifically cited an April 30 speech by the White House’s counterterrorism point man, John Brennan, outlining the laws, rules and ethics that guide the drone campaign. It’s a pretty good speech and definitely worth reading if you care about these issues. But Brennan doesn’t really address the point of my article, which is the danger that drone strikes could have a counterproductive effect. The civilian casualties and general resentment they breed in places like Pakistan and Yemen clearly threaten to undermine long-term American interests in those countries, even if we are nailing some top al-Qaeda figures in the short term. But reading Brennan’s remarks drove home a point that virtually no one discusses, but that is a little startling when you step back and contemplate it. It is the Obama Administration’s heavy reliance on a law enacted by Congress three days after the Sept. 11 attacks that justified an extremely broad range of military action in the name of fighting terrorism. Here’s Brennan: First, these targeted strikes are legal. Attorney General Holder, Harold Koh and Jeh Johnson have all addressed this question at length. To briefly recap, as a matter of domestic law, the Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of attack. The Authorization for Use of Military Force — the AUMF — passed by Congress after the Sept. 11 attacks authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those nations, organizations and individuals responsible for 9/11. There is nothing in the AUMF that restricts the use of military force against al-Qaeda to Afghanistan.

#### Decreasing AUMF authorizations snowballs- causes judicial rollback of the AUMF

Barnes, 12 -- J.D. Candidate, Boston University School of Law

[Beau, “Reauthorizing the ‘War on Terror’: The Legal and Policy Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence,” Military Law Review, Vol 211, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2150874, accessed 8-21-13, mss]

**The scope of** the **AUMF is** also **important for** any **future judicial opinion** that might rely in part on Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence.23 Support from Congress places the President’s actions in Jackson’s first zone, where executive power is at its zenith, because it “includes all that [the president]~~he~~ possesses in [their]~~his~~ own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”24 Express or **implied congressional disapproval, discernible by identifying the outer limits of** the **AUMF’s authorization, would place the President’s “power . . . at its lowest ebb**.”25 In this third zone, executive claims “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”26 Indeed, Jackson specifically rejected an overly powerful executive, observing that the Framers did not intend to fashion the President into an American monarch.27 Jackson’s concurrence has become the **most significant guidepost** in debates over the constitutionality of executive action in the realm of national security and foreign relations.28 Indeed, some have argued that it was given “the status of law”29 by then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist in Dames & Moore v. Regan.30 Speaking for the Court, Rehnquist applied Jackson’s tripartite framework to an executive order settling pending U.S. claims against Iran, noting that “[t]he parties and the lower courts . . . have all agreed that much relevant analysis is contained in [Youngstown].”31 More recently, Chief Justice John Roberts declared that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in [the area of foreign relations law].”32 Should a future court adjudicate the nature or extent of the President’s authority to engage in military actions against terrorists, an applicable statute would confer upon such executive action “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”33 The AUMF therefore exercises a profound legal influence on the future of the United States’ struggle against terrorism, and its precise scope, authorization, and continuing vitality matter a great deal.

#### That shifts US doctrine to international self-defense- expanded *jus ad bellum* collapses global firebreak on use-of-force

Barnes, 12 -- J.D. Candidate, Boston University School of Law

[Beau, “Reauthorizing the ‘War on Terror’: The Legal and Policy Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence,” Military Law Review, Vol 211, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2150874, accessed 9-19-13, mss]

In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued worldwide counterterrorism operations on various alternative domestic legal authorities. All of these alternative bases, however, carry with them significant costs—detrimental to U.S. security and democracy. The foreign and national security policy of the United States should rest on “a comprehensive legal regime to support its actions, one that [has] the blessings of Congress and to which a court would defer as the collective judgment of the American political system about a novel set of problems.”141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international level as well. Denying the Executive Branch the authority to carry out military operations in the armed conflict against Al Qaeda would force the President to find authorization elsewhere, most likely in the international law of selfdefense— the jus ad bellum.142 Finding sufficient legal authority for the United States’s ongoing counterterrorism operations in the international law of self-defense, however, is problematic for several reasons. As a preliminary matter, relying on this rationale usurps Congress’s role in regulating the contours of U.S. foreign and national security policy. If the Executive Branch can assert “self-defense against a continuing threat” to target and detain terrorists worldwide, it will almost always be able to find such a threat.143 Indeed, the Obama Administration’s broad understanding of the concept of “imminence” illustrates the danger of allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous “slippery slopes.” Once the President authorizes a targeted killing of an individual who does not pose an imminent threat in the strict law enforcement sense of “imminence,”145 there are few potential targets that would be off-limits to the Executive Branch. Overly malleable concepts are not the proper bases for the consistent use of military force in a democracy. Although the **Obama** Administration has **disclaimed** this manner of **broad authority because the AUMF “does not authorize** military **force** **against anyone** the Executive labels a ‘terrorist,’”146 **relying solely on** the **international** law of **self** **defense would** likely **lead to precisely such a result**. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s military actions and the issue of domestic control. The creation of international norms is an iterative process, one to which the United States makes significant contributions. Because of this outsized influence, the United States should not claim international legal rights that it is not prepared to see proliferate around the globe. Scholars have observed that the Obama Administration’s “expansive and open-ended interpretation of the right to self-defence threatens to destroy the prohibition on the use of armed force . . . .”147 Indeed, “[i]f other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does, to kill people anywhere, anytime, **the result would be chaos**.”148

#### Causes global hotspots to go nuclear

Obayemi, 6 -- East Bay Law School professor

[Olumide, admitted to the Bars of Federal Republic of Nigeria and the State of California, Golden Gate University School of Law, "Article: Legal Standards Governing Pre-Emptive Strikes and Forcible Measures of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under the U.N. Charter and General International Law," 12 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 19, l/n, accessed 9-19-13, mss]

The United States must abide by the rigorous standards set out above that are meant to govern the use of preemptive strikes, because today's international system is characterized by a relative infrequency of interstate war. It has been noted that developing doctrines that lower the threshold for preemptive action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. n100 This is important as O'Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg have rightly noted: ...countries already on the brink of war, and leaning strongly towards war, might use the doctrine to justify an action they already wished to take, and the effect of the U.S. posture may make it harder for the international community in general, and the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy. Potential examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and Taiwan, to the Middle East. But perhaps the clearest case is the India-Pakistan crisis. n101 The world must be a safe place to live in. We cannot be ruled by bandits and rogue states. There must be law and order not only in the books but in enforcement as well. No nation is better suited to enforce international law than the United States. The Bush Doctrine will stand the test [\*42] of time and survive. Again, we submit that nothing more would protect the world and its citizens from nuclear weapons, terrorists and rogue states than an able and willing nation like the United States, acting as a policeman of the world within all legal boundaries. This is the essence of the preamble to the United Nations Charter.

### 4

#### US-Saudi relations are high now – counter terrorism cooperation is critical to the alliance

Riedel 8/21/13 (Bruce, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, "US and Saudis Share Needs If Not Values")

America's alliance with Saudi Arabia began with F.D.R. in 1945, and for almost 70 years the kingdom has been our most reliable ally in the Muslim world. It has fought the Soviets, Saddam, Khomeini and Bin Laden with us while providing critical backing to the Arab-Israeli peace process.¶ With its vast oil resources and command of Mecca, the House of Saud is a formidable ally. But the alliance has always been based on shared threat assessments, not shared values. The King is the world's last absolute monarchy. There is no pretense of democracy or pluralism in the Kingdom.¶ The Saudis have led the counter revolution to the Arab Awakening, occupying Bahrain, controlling change in Yemen and backing the army coup d'etat in Egypt with money and royal approval. The king personally has embraced General Sisi and the crackdown on the Brotherhood. Even in Syria, where Riyadh backs the rebels, they want a Sunni strong man to replace Assad not a democracy.¶ Washington and Riyadh still need each other. Many of our interests still over lap. Saudi assistance helps our allies like Jordan and Morocco.Saudi intelligence was key to foiling the last two al Qaeda plots to attack the American homeland and is critical to the battle in Yemen against the terrorists. Saudi Arabia is also central to keeping pressure on Iran through sanctions by replacing Iranian oil on the market.¶ America has much to lose and little to gain if the Arab revolutions spread to the kingdom itself. So we face the challenge of being the Saudis' ally while we disagree on core values.

#### The plan would crush US-Saudi relations – a hardline stance against AQAP is critical to Saudi legitimacy

Eakin 12 (Hugh, IRP Gatekeeper Editor, May 21 2012 The New York Review, "Saudi Arabia and the New US War in Yemen"

What seems clear is that Saudi Arabia has become a key backer—and at times coordinator—of the accelerating US drone war and special operations offensive in Yemen, partly for its own security interests. Interior Ministry officials in Riyadh speak enthusiastically about the US drone program, and on May 12, drone strikes allegedly killed some eleven AQAP suspects, [two of them Saudi nationals](http://www.voanews.com/content/drones_in_yemen_kill_11_militants/566327.html). (It is worth noting, following the controversial killing of US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, that Saudi Arabia does not appear to have many qualms about killing its own citizens in Yemen.)¶ Perhaps most important for the Saudi government, a successful counterterrorism policy carries enormous political value amid the upheavals of the Arab Spring. Even more than democratization or regime change in the region, the Saudi rulers seem to fear instability and unpredictability: though they have reluctantly supported the transition of power in Yemen, they are particularly nervous about the kind of extremism that has emerged in neighboring countries like Iraq, Yemen, and now Syria, when uprisings turn into violent conflict or authority breaks down entirely—places where Saudi jihadists have often found new causes. “Syria will be tempting to al-Qaeda,” Abdulrahman Alhadaq, a Saudi counter terrorism official, said in a briefing in Riyadh. “We need to avoid another Iraq.”¶ But Saudi counterterrorism efforts are also an important element in achieving consensus and legitimacy for the Saudi regime itself. Many young Saudis are growing increasingly impatient with their government’s oppressive status quo, and not a little of their ire is directed against the Interior Ministry, which has been blamed for arbitrary arrests of activists and human rights lawyers. Yet many I spoke to also seem to fear the chaos and violence that has engulfed so many of the country’s neighbors. In the early 2000s, when the Saudi government sponsored national dialogues to bring together activists, reformers, conservatives, and Islamists from across the ideological spectrum to suggest avenues of change, the country’s counterterrorism approach was one issue on which there was near universal agreement. (Participants in one of these dialogues explicitly endorsed a strategy of repentence and reconciliation for extremists.)¶ Turning Saudi Arabia into the US’s indispensable ally in Yemen—while making Yemen the central conflict in the US-led war against terrorism—has considerable strategic value for Crown Prince Nayef, who was named the heir apparent to King Abdullah last fall. As US-Saudi collaboration on security and counterterrorism has increased, the regime has largely avoided US pressure on human rights and domestic reforms. And while it keeps the terror threat at bay, at least within its own borders, the Interior Ministry can hold up Yemen as the example of what might happen at home if its broad powers were curbed. Whether that argument will continue to assuage the country’s youth remains an open question.

#### That causes Saudi nuclearization

Rozen ‘11 [Laura, the chief foreign policy reporter for Politico, quoting Patrick Clawson, a Persian Gulf expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Marc Lynch, a Middle East expert at George Washington University, Arab spring setbacks in the shadow of complicated U.S.-Saudi alliance, 4/18/11, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_theenvoy/20110418/ts_yblog_theenvoy/optimism-for-arab-spring-fades-in-face-of-complicated-u-s-saudi-alliance>]

**Riyadh, alarmed by** the **Obama** administration's failure to prop up its ally of three decades Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, **is sending signs of its displeasure and interest in exploring alternative security arrangements**. Last month, former Saudi envoy to Washington now Saudi national security chief Prince **Bandar** **went to Pakistan, ostensibly to discuss the possibility of recruiting Pakistani troops** to help Sunni Gulf allies suppress Bahraini unrest. But some Washington **Middle East analysts interpreted the visit as a signal of possible Saudi interest in exploring being protected by a Pakistani nuclear security umbrella, or acquiring Pakistani nuclear weapons, if Washington doesn't sufficiently assure Riyadh that it will protect it from a nuclear Iran**. "The big problem we face is that at the very least the **Saudis** and [United Arab Emirates] **wonder to what extent we are committed to their most vital interests**," said Patrick Clawson, a Persian Gulf expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Prince Bandar's visit to Pakistan is a shot across our bow of what the Saudis may feel is necessary if the U.S. is not providing an effective security guarantee.... The rumors in the region have long been that the Saudis paid a fair chunk of the bill" for Pakistan's nuclear program. "The momentum of the Arab revolutions has stalled, and the old Middle East is reasserting itself," said Marc Lynch, a Middle East expert at George Washington University who frequently consults with the Obama administration. In the current strategic malaise, Lynch said, "the Israelis and Palestinians are saying, 'what about us?' **The 'contain Iran' crowd is saying, 'don't forget about Iran.'" And the Saudis are playing up rising Sunni-Shiite tensions in the region, which "gives them an excuse," he added, to push their contain-Iran agenda, as well as to "equate Iranian subversion for use against their own Shia population**. Any time Saudi Shia make demands for political rights, they are accused of being Iranian agents."

#### Causes nuclear war and turns terrorism

Edelman ‘11 [Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense—AND—Andrew Krepinevich—President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments—AND—Evan Montgomery—Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Eric, The dangers of a nuclear Iran, FA 90;1, <http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf>]

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2S, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi-polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

### 1NC – Solvo

#### Obama can circumvent the plan- covert loopholes are inevitable

**Lohmann 1-28**-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

**The executive will redefine the law to violate and ignore the plan**

Pollack, 13 -- MSU Guggenheim Fellow and professor of history emeritus [Norman, "Drones, Israel, and the Eclipse of Democracy," Counterpunch, 2-5-13, www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/05/drones-israel-and-the-eclipse-of-democracy/, accessed 9-1-13, mss]

Bisharat first addresses the transmogrification of international law by Israel’s military lawyers. We might call this damage control, were it not more serious. When the Palestinians first sought to join the I.C.C., and then, to receive the UN’s conferral of nonmember status on them, Israel raised fierce opposition. Why? He writes: “Israel’s frantic opposition to the elevation of Palestine’s status at the United Nations was motivated precisely by the fear that it would soon lead to I.C.C. jurisdiction over Palestinian claims of war crimes. Israeli leaders are unnerved for good reason. The I.C.C. could prosecute major international crimes committed on Palestinian soil anytime after the court’s founding on July 1, 2002.” In response to the threat, we see the deliberate reshaping of the law: Since 2000, “the Israel Defense Forces, guided by its military lawyers, have attempted to **remake the laws** of war by consciously violating them and then **creating new legal concepts to provide juridical cover** for their misdeeds.” (Italics, mine) In other words, habituate the law to the existence of atrocities; in the US‘s case, targeted assassination, repeated often enough, seems permissible, indeed clever and wise, as pressure is steadily applied to the laws of war. Even then, “collateral damage” is seen as unintentional, regrettable, but hardly prosecutable, and in the current atmosphere of complicity and desensitization, never a war crime. (**Obama is hardly a novice at** this game of **stretching the law to suit the convenience of**, shall we say, the **national interest**? In order to ensure the distortion in counting civilian casualties, which would bring the number down, as Brennan with a straight face claimed, was “zero,” the Big Lie if ever there was one, placing him in distinguished European company, Obama **redefined the meaning** of “combatant” status to be any male of military age throughout the area (which we) declared a combat zone, which noticeably led to a higher incidence of sadism, because it allowed for “second strikes” on funerals—the assumption that anyone attending must be a terrorist—and first responders, those who went to the aid of the wounded and dying, themselves also certainly terrorists because of their rescue attempts.) These guys play hardball, perhaps no more than in using—by report—the proverbial baseball cards to designate who would be next on the kill list. But funerals and first responders—verified by accredited witnesses–seems overly much, and not a murmur from an adoring public.

### 1NC – Sig Strikes – O

#### Terror threat low now- weakened terrorists not focused on large-scale attacks on the West- best intel

Ackerman, 13 -- Wired senior reporter

[Spencer, "Spy Chiefs Point to a Much, Much Weaker Al-Qaida," Wired, 3-13-13, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/spy-terrorism/, accessed 9-18-13, mss]

Don’t ever expect the heads of the U.S.’ 16-agency spy apparatus to say it outright. But the testimony they provided Tuesday morning to a Senate panel described al-Qaida, the scourge of the U.S. for 12 years, as a threat that’s on the verge of becoming a spent force, if they’re not already. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, and his colleagues at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Counterterrorism Center and State Department, never made that contention outright to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Tuesday. But in their annual public briefing on the threats America faces, they focused on their budgets and on cyber attacks more than they did terrorism. Not only was that itself a big change in the annual exercise, what they said about the threat from al-Qaida was mostly cheerful news. Al-Qaida’s core in Pakistan is so degraded that it is “probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks in the West,” Clapper testified. (.pdf) Its regional affiliates, in Iraq, Somalia and northern Africa, are focused on local attacks. Despite all the online propaganda seeking to radicalize American Muslim, homegrown jihadis will attempt “fewer than ten domestic plots per year.” Last year, the plots hit the single digits; no one died from them. Matt Olsen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testified that those attempts are and are likely to remain “unsophisticated.” Those al-Qaida manages to inspire may be “wayward knuckleheads,” Olsen said, but they’ll remain a challenge for the spy apparatus to monitor and disrupt. The exception is al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen affiliate of the organization, which remains the one most inclined to attack the U.S. at home. FBI director Robert Mueller said the threat to U.S. airliners from that affiliate is “undiminished.” Attacking outside Yemen remains a priority for the organization. But Clapper said they’ll have to balance that agenda with both their aspirations in Yemen and the degree to which “they have individuals who can manage, train, and deploy operatives for U.S. operations.” To be clear, not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida is no longer a big deal. Not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida no longer threatens the United States. And not a single spy chief so much as hinted that it’s time for U.S. officials to consider the global war on terrorism finished. Ever since the Benghazi attack of September, those officials and their spy chiefs have stopped predicting that al-Qaida is on the verge of defeat. If anything, Clapper warned that the budget crunch he’s under might make it harder to spot and prevent the next al-Qaida attack. Yet the picture they presented of al-Qaida is no longer one of a determined global movement growing in strength; seeking the world’s deadliest weapons; and capable of pulling off complex, mass-casualty assaults. Benghazi, and the January attack on an Algerian oil field, look like models for the terrorist threats of the future: ones that occur far from U.S. soil, launched by unaffiliated groups that are primarily focused on a local agenda, yet sufficiently inspired by al-Qaida’s rhetoric or sympathetic to its worldview that unsecured western targets of opportunity are in its cross-hairs. Left unsaid and un-debated at the hearing: whether that diminished threat means it’s time to roll back the U.S. global wartime apparatus; or whether it’s only diminished because of an aggressive wartime apparatus that **needs to keep doing what it’s doing, lest the threat re-emerge**.

#### Signature strike solve terrorism – take away operational capacity of terrorist groups

Mudd, 13 – New America Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative senior research fellow

[Philip, former FBI National Security Deputy Director, former CIA Counterterrorist Center Deputy Director, George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute senior fellow, sits on the advisory board for the National Counterterrorism Center and for the Director of National Intelligence, serves on the Aspen Institute’s Homeland Security Group, SouthernSun Asset Management director of global risk, "Fear Factor: In defense of Obama's deadly signature strikes," Foreign Policy, 5-24-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear\_factor\_signature\_strikes, accessed 6-10-13, mss]

The impact of armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism campaign is hard to overestimate: Without operational commanders and visionary leaders, terror groups decay into locally focused threats, or disappear altogether. Targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders and commanders in the years immediately after 9/11 deprived the group of the time and stability required to plot a major strike. But the London subway attacks in July 2005 illustrated the remaining potency of al Qaeda's core in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat was fading steadily. But not fast enough. So-called signature strikes -- in which target selection is based not on identification of an individual but instead on patterns of behavior or unique characteristics that identify a group -- accelerated this decline for simple reasons. Targeting leadership degrades a small percentage of a diffuse terror group, but developing the tactical intelligence required to locate an individual precisely enough to stage a pinpoint strike, in a no-man's land half a world away, is time-consuming and difficult. And it's not a perfect science; the leaders of groups learn over time how to operate more securely. Furthermore, these leaders represent only a fraction of the threat: Osama bin Laden might have been the public face of al Qaeda, but he was supported by a web of document-forgers, bombmakers, couriers, trainers, ideologues, and others. They made up the bulk of al Qaeda and propelled the apparatus that planned the murder of innocents. Bin Laden was the revolutionary leader, but it was the troops who executed his vision. Signature strikes have pulled out these lower-level threads of al Qaeda's apparatus -- and that of its global affiliates -- rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by the destruction of the complex support structure below them. Western conceptions of how organizations work, with hierarchal structures driven by top-level managers, do not apply to al Qaeda and its affiliates. These groups are instead conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups. They are hard to map cleanly, in other words. Signature strikes take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly -- so rapidly that the groups cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience. The tempo of the strikes, in other words, adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their operational capability faster than the groups can recover. There are other rationales for these attacks, though. Part of the reason signature strikes have become so prominent in this global counterterror war is, simply put, geography. Local **terrorist groups only become international threats if they** **have leadership that can execute a** broad, **globalist vision, and** if that leadership has **the time and space to plot** without daily distractions from armies and security services -- as **in safe havens** like Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, and the tribal areas of Pakistan. These are exactly the places where the United States cannot apply conventional force and where local governments lack the capability or will to counter the threat. Exactly the places where drones offer an option to eviscerate a growing terror threat that has a dispersed, diffuse hierarchy. The places where signature strikes have proven effective. With more capable security partners, the brutal destruction from drones above might come from more conventional operations on the ground. But, by definition, safe havens aren't penetrable by capable security services. There is an intangible factor that reinforces the effectiveness of signature strikes: the fear factor, coupled with the suspicions and paranoia that result from organizations searching desperately among their ranks to find out who is providing the Americans information so detailed that we can wreak such havoc over such a long period of time. Time and again, intelligence has clearly told us that the adversary dreads these operations -- lethal strikes that come anytime, anywhere, and that eliminate entire swaths of organizations. And these same organizations then turn around and further degrade their operational capability by engaging in savage hunts for leaks.

#### Signature strikes prevent worse, more destabilizing strikes

**Byman ’13** [Daniel L. Byman, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>]

The United States has recently taken to launching “signature strikes,” which target not specific individuals but instead groups engaged in suspicious activities. This approach makes it even more difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians and verify body counts of each. Still, as one U.S. official told The New York Times last year, “Al Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization—innocent neighbors don’t hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border with guns and bombs.” Of course, not everyone accepts this reasoning. Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani, who runs Pakistan Body Count, says that “neither [the United States] nor Pakistan releases any detailed information about the victims . . . so [although the United States] likes to call everybody Taliban, I call everybody civilians.”¶ The truth is that all the public numbers are unreliable. Who constitutes a civilian is often unclear; when trying to kill the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, for example, the United States also killed his doctor. The doctor was not targeting U.S. or allied forces, but he was aiding a known terrorist leader. In addition, most strikes are carried out in such remote locations that it is nearly impossible for independent sources to verify who was killed. In Pakistan, for example, the overwhelming majority of drone killings occur in tribal areas that lie outside the government’s control and are prohibitively dangerous for Westerners and independent local journalists to enter. Thus, although the New America Foundation has come under fire for relying heavily on unverifiable information provided by anonymous U.S. officials, reports from local Pakistani organizations, and the Western organizations that rely on them, are no better: their numbers are frequently doctored by the Pakistani government or by militant groups. After a strike in Pakistan, militants often cordon off the area, remove their dead, and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves. The U.S. media often then draw on such faulty reporting to give the illusion of having used multiple sources. As a result, statistics on civilians killed by drones are often inflated. One of the few truly independent on-the-ground reporting efforts, conducted by the Associated Press last year, concluded that the strikes “are killing far fewer civilians than many in [Pakistan] are led to believe.”¶ But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths—about one to three, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism—is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes. Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos, for example, pack a much more deadly payload. In December 2009, the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen, and over 30 people were killed in the blast, most of them women and children. At the time, the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones, but had this not been the case, a drone’s real-time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children, and the attack would have been aborted. Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason, the drone’s far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents. Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems. But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force.

#### Low level strikes destroy operational effectiveness of terror groups---they can’t recruit new operatives fast enough to keep pace with losses

Alex Young 13, Associate Staff, Harvard International Review, 2/25/13, “A Defense of Drones,” Harvard International Review, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones

Moreover, drone strikes have disrupted al Qaeda’s system for training new recruits. The Times of London reports that in 2009, Al Qaeda leaders decided to abandon their traditional training camps because bringing new members to a central location offered too easy a target for drone strikes. Foreign Policy emphasized this trend on November 2nd, 2012, arguing that, “destroying communication centers, training camps and vehicles undermines the operational effectiveness of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and quotes from operatives of the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network reveal that drones have forced them into a ‘jungle existence’ where they fear for the lives on a daily basis.” The threat of death from the skies has forced extremist organizations to become more scattered.

More importantly, though, drone strikes do not only kill top leaders; they target their militant followers as well. The New America Foundation, a think tank that maintains a database of statistics on drone strikes, reports that between 2004 and 2012, drones killed between 1,489 and 2,605 enemy combatants in Pakistan. Given that Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and the various other organizations operating in the region combined do not possibly have more than 1,500 senior leaders, it follows that many, if not most, of those killed were low-level or mid-level members – in many cases, individuals who would have carried out attacks. The Los Angeles Times explains that, “the Predator campaign has depleted [Al Qaeda’s] operational tier. Many of the dead are longtime loyalists who had worked alongside Bin Laden […] They are being replaced by less experienced recruits.” Drones decimate terrorist organizations at all levels; the idea that these strikes only kill senior officials is a myth.

### 1NC – Terror D

#### Their economy is strong and resilient and US cooperation high- newest evidence

Desk ’13 (Web Desk, The Express Tribune, “Economic stability of Pakistan an encouraging sign: Olson”, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/491648/economic-stability-of-pakistan-an-encouraging-sign-olson>, January 9, 2013)

ISLAMABAD: US Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson in a meeting with finance minister Dr Abdul Hafeez Sheikh on Wednesday said that economic stability of Pakistan is an encouraging sign, Radio Pakistan reported. Dr Sheikh said that despite energy scarcity and security issue in the country‚ economic indicators are showing positive trends which reflect resilience of the economy. The Finance Minister added that due to economic policies of the government‚ Pakistan is currently witnessing the lowest inflation rate in the region and the Karachi Stock Exchange has emerged as the best performing Stock Exchange in the world. Both the sides reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing economic relations. Olson said that the United States is assisting Pakistan in many public welfare projects and will continue to do so in future to further cement the relations between the two people. The Ambassador said that the US values its relations with Pakistan and would continue to move forward in a number of mutually beneficial areas.

#### No Indo-Pak War

Wright ‘13 (Thomas Wright is a fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Managing Global Order project. Previously, he was executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and senior researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security, "Don’t Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties," <http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/>, January 16, 2013)

There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But that doesn’t necessarily presage anything more drastic. Pakistan claims another of its soldiers died Tuesday night in firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir, the divided Himalayan region claimed by both nations. Indian army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, on Wednesday, said Pakistan had opened fire and India retaliated. “If any of their people have died, it would have been in retaliation to their firing,” Gen. Singh said. ”When they fire, we also fire.” It was the latest in tit-for-tat recriminations over deaths in Kashmir that began last week. Pakistan claimed one of its soldiers died on Jan. 6. Two days later, India said Pakistani forces killed two of its soldiers and mutilated the bodies. Tuesday night, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the mutilations meant it could not be “business as usual” between the countries. That has worried some that peace talks, which have been in train for two years, could be about to break down. Mr. Singh’s comments built on a drumbeat of anger from India. Gen. Singh, Monday called the mutilations “unpardonable” and said India withheld the right to retaliate to Pakistan aggression when and where it chooses. Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, who is in the U.S., Tuesday termed the Indian army chief’s comments as “very hostile.” There are some other worrying signs. India said Tuesday it was delaying the start of a visa-on-arrival program meant to make it easier for some Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other’s countries. The visa program, like talks on opening up bilateral trade, is supposed to pave the way toward broader peace talks that would encompass thornier issues, like how to solve the Kashmir problem. Also Tuesday, nine Pakistani hockey players who had come to participate in a tournament in India were sent home due to fears of protests and violence against them. Still, there’s little benefit for either side to escalate what is now still sporadic firing over the Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan is embroiled in its own political meltdown sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to order the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on allegations of corruption. Tens of thousands of protesters Tuesday took to the streets in Islamabad, and remain there today, demanding immediate elections and a greater role for the army and Supreme Court in politics. Pakistan’s military continues to play an important political role, dominating defense and foreign policy. But it has so far shown little sign of mounting a full-blown coup despite persistent rumors of military intervention. Pakistan’s government must hold national elections by May, meaning the next few months are likely to be choppy ones in Pakistan politics. In such an environment, the military is unlikely to want to dial up tensions with India. On the Indian side, despite Mr. Singh’s unusually strident tone Tuesday, there also will be pause before taking matters to the next level. Mr. Singh has put immense personal political capital into trying to improve ties with Pakistan since he came to power in 2004. Last year, he hosted Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in New Delhi and promised a return visit. Such a trip is clearly off the table for now. But India still has put too much into peace talks to throw away the progress made so far on visas, trade and other issues. Even Gen. Singh, India’s army chief, Monday said he did not believe the latest flare-up would lead to a broader escalation in violence and an official end to a 2003 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir. The clashes so far, he noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control.

#### Blowback is hype- it’s minimal, we have secret support, and alternatives are worse

**Byman ’13** [Daniel L. Byman, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>]

It is also telling that drones have earned the backing, albeit secret, of foreign governments. In order to maintain popular support, politicians in Pakistan and Yemen routinely rail against the U.S. drone campaign. In reality, however, the governments of both countries have supported it. During the Bush and Obama administrations, Pakistan has even periodically hosted U.S. drone facilities and has been told about strikes in advance. Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan until 2008, was not worried about the drone program’s negative publicity: “In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time,” he reportedly remarked. Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, also at times allowed drone strikes in his country and even covered for them by telling the public that they were conducted by the Yemeni air force. When the United States’ involvement was leaked in 2002, however, relations between the two countries soured. Still, Saleh later let the drone program resume in Yemen, and his replacement, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, has publicly praised drones, saying that “they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know what target you’re aiming at.”¶ As officials in both Pakistan and Yemen realize, U.S. drone strikes help their governments by targeting common enemies. A memo released by the antisecrecy website WikiLeaks revealed that Pakistan’s army chief, Ashfaq Parvez kayani, privately asked U.S. military leaders in 2008 for “continuous Predator coverage” over antigovernment militants, and the journalist Mark Mazzetti has reported that the United States has conducted “goodwill kills” against Pakistani militants who threatened Pakistan far more than the United States. Thus, in private, Pakistan supports the drone program. As then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told Anne Patterson, then the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, in 2008, “We’ll protest [against the drone program] in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”¶ Still, Pakistan is reluctant to make its approval public. First of all, the country’s inability to fight terrorists on its own soil is a humiliation for Pakistan’s politically powerful armed forces and intelligence service. In addition, although drones kill some of the government’s enemies, they have also targeted pro-government groups that are hostile to the United States, such as the Haqqani network and the Taliban, which Pakistan has supported since its birth in the early 1990s. Even more important, the Pakistani public is vehemently opposed to U.S. drone strikes.¶ A 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing drone campaign. Similarly, in Yemen, as the scholar Gregory Johnsen has pointed out, drone strikes can win the enmity of entire tribes. This has led critics to argue that the drone program is shortsighted: that it kills today’s enemies but creates tomorrow’s in the process.¶ Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

### 1NC - Norms

#### Prolif is inevitable- no one models US restraint

**Etzioni ‘13** [Amitai, professor of international relations at George Washington University, “The Great Drone Debate,” March-April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>]

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

#### Drone prolif doesn’t escalate or cause terrorism

**Singh ’12** [Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, an independent and non-partisan organization that focuses on researching and analyzing national security and defense policies, also a research assistant at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America, is a War and Peace Fellow at the Dickey Center, a global research organization, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” 8-13-12, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>]

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.¶ Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones:¶ – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue.¶ – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose.¶ – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face.¶ – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts.¶ In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Other countries will just cheat…come on now

Lerner ‘13

[BEN LERNER](http://spectator.org/people/ben-lerner), 3.25.13, American Spectator, “[Judging ‘Drones’ From Afar](http://spectator.org/archives/2013/03/25/judging-drones-from-afar),” http://spectator.org/archives/2013/03/25/judging-drones-from-afar

Whatever the potential motivations for trying to codify international rules for using UAVs, such a move would be ill advised. While in theory, every nation that signs onto a treaty governing UAVs will be bound by its requirements, it is unlikely to play out this way in practice. It strains credulity to assume that China, Russia, Iran, and other non-democratic actors will not selectively apply (at best) such rules to themselves while using them as a cudgel with which to bash their rivals and score political points. The United States and its democratic allies, meanwhile, are more likely to adhere to the commitments for which they signed up. The net result: we are boxed in as far as our own self-defense, while other nations with less regard for the rule of law go use their UAVs to take out whomever, whenever, contorting said “rules” as they see fit. One need only look at China’s [manipulation](http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/02/17/why-to-forget-unclos/) of the Law of the Sea Treaty to justify its vast territorial claims at the expense of its neighbors to see how this often plays out.

#### China won’t use drones aggressively- rationality checks

**Erickson and Strange 5-29**-13 [Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange is a researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, “China has drones. Now how will it use them?” <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html>]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Myanmar drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the anti-drug bureau in China's Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham's mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham's capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it. The limitations on China's drone use are reflected in the country's academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a US aircraft carrier - which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China's contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military's tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing's overarching approach remains one of caution - something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone programme.

#### Miniscule risk of war – multiple warrants

**Moss 2-10**-2013 (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009. “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War” http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true) BW

Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers: “Don't be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.

These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one.And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict.

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan:

1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation

at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.

2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.

**3.** Question marks over **the PLA’s operational effectiveness**. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.

4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all.

**5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention**. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase.

6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).

7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.

In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations.

However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget.

Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch.

In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

## 2NC CX

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Over the three and a half years of Barack Obama’s presidency, “signature strikes,” which are CIA-authorized attacks based on general targeting of groups rather than specific targeting of individuals, have dramatically increased. At Obama’s direction, the CIA has carried out 292 such secret attacks in the first three and a half years of his presidency. That is five times more than the Bush administration carried out, according to a newly published report on drone attacks by the Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law. There is little if any transparency on the decision making process that goes into these, and many international human rights law experts believe they result in extrajudicial murder. These “signature strikes,” also sometimes more bluntly referred to in national security circles as “crowd kills,” are often where the US is making its worst mistakes in killing civilians, military analysts and human rights workers say. The hallmark of the Obama administration’s use of drones has been an expansion of these “signature strikes.” What distinguishes these strikes from other drone attacks is that they are not based on specific evidence of known individuals or enemy combatants but rather on general information about “military-age males.” Such strikes were initiated under Bush in 2008, according to the Council on Foreign Relations’ Micah Zenko, who has researched them extensively. “In an effort to reduce the Pakistani safe haven that was being used to attack US soldiers in Afghanistan, President Bush authorized drone strikes against anonymous militants whose behavior – based on signals intelligence, human agents and drone surveillance – resembles that of Taliban or Al Qaeda leaders,” said Zenko. “Signature strikes are problematic because they are not carefully vetted by the inter-agency process and they are often less precise and less discriminate,” Zenko told GlobalPost, adding that there also appears to be a pattern in the CIA tactic which includes staggered, follow-on strikes to kill rescuers of initial victims known as “double taps.” The United States has never issued any statement of apology for the March 17 attack, not has any US government official ever acknowledged nor defended the practice of these “signature strikes” or “crowd kills.” In fact, the mere mention of signature strikes has left US officials stumbling and evasive. In April, John Brennan, Obama’s National Security Advisor, was asked at the Woodrow Wilson Center, “If you could address the issue of signature strikes, which I guess aren’t necessarily targeted against specific individuals?” Brennan replied: “You make reference to signature strikes that are frequently reported in the press. I was speaking here specifically about targeted strikes against individuals who are involved.” The US government declines to make any recognition of nor comment on such strikes, but as journalist and author Daniel Klaidman uncovered in his new book, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency, Obama was uncomfortable enough with the term “crowd kill” that he changed the name, if not the tactic. These attacks, as Klaidman revealed, are now referred to as “TADS,” an acronym for a Terrorist Attack Disruption Strike. And these tactics are being employed not just in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, according to Klaidman’s research. No matter what name it goes by, the attack in North Waziristan has hurt US efforts in Pakistan, according to Pakistani as well as Western diplomats and security analysts. The March 17 strike was a dramatic stain on the record of US drone policy. When mistakes like this are made, they exact a great toll on US interests as well as Pakistani lives. In addition to killing tens of civilians, the strike alienated and enraged not only victims’ relatives like Noor Khan, but the broader group of tribal citizens in the region, some of whom actually had a previously favorable view of discriminate drone strikes as an effective means of eliminating their Taliban enemies while sparing civilian lives. The United States simply cannot afford any amore faulty strikes like this, which are more impactful than the effective strikes. The strike gave further ammunition to the forces which are exploiting the issue for political reasons, and also provided Pakistan with political capital to use as a leverage in its tense relationship with the US. Even 18 months after this attack, litigation remains, victims’ relatives and locals are still angry and political groups (and terrorist organizations) seize upon that energy to keep up the drum beat against America. “For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction and such attacks will result in the increase of hatred for the US,” said Noor Khan. “We have gone to the court to know who has allowed these attacks and on what legal ground,” Khan said about the petition which he, along with other relatives of the victims, have filed in a Pakistani court. Just last week a march in Waziristan was led by the once-great Pakistani cricket star turned maverick populist political leader, Imran Khan. He gathered thousands of demonstrators, hailing from cities and villages across Pakistan and from other countries, including several dozen activists who traveled from America, to protest the US use of weaponized drones and the way in which their proliferation worldwide is against international law and basic human rights. Their march was thwarted by authorities, but the attempt was covered in the international media and by many accounts succeeded in the organizers’ goals of drawing attention to their view that the US policy of drone strikes are a violation of international law. The March 17 attack came at a particularly sensitive time in Pakistan-US relations, on the heels of the release of a CIA contractor named Raymond Davis, who was involved in the killing of two Pakistanis in the city of Lahore and was later released when the families of those he killed had accepted ‘blood money.’ The Pakistani military, under public pressure over the release, came up with an unusual harshly worded condemnation of the attack. The chief of the Pakistan Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani termed the attack as the violation of human rights and “unjustified and intolerable under any circumstances.” It was announced that those targeted in the attack would be compensated, but locals, including Noor Khan, knew that this is was a public gimmick and thus refused to take the compensation offered by the government. “For us the people killed were more important than the money offered as compensation," said Noor Khan. Similarly, his brother Anwar Khan said, “We don’t sell our dead.” In background briefings at the time of the March 17, 2011 attack, American officials strongly refuted the claims of civilian killings and were of the view that those killed were fighters who were planning an attack against American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. And at that time a Pakistani intelligence official told me that 13 of the dead were Pakistani Taliban fighters, including at least one commander. Since then there has been persistent scrutiny and a rising crescendo of criticism. US officials have since acknowledged that civilians were killed and that mistakes were made. The Associated Press carried out a thorough investigation of the attacks and found that four of the victims were Taliban leaders. In the end, the attack has come to embody the weaknesses of the “signature strikes.” But not all of the drone strikes resemble the story of the March 17 strike. Another drone attack which took place almost exactly a year later — on March 13, 2012 in the Sra Khowra area of South Waziristan close to the Afghanistan border —has had a very different impact and it is worth comparing the two. The strike killed Amir Hamza and Shams Ullah, both high-ranking Taliban commanders who were commanders with the Haqqani-affiliated Molvi Nazir Group. The Taliban acknowledged and vowed to avenge their deaths in a public statement distributed in pamphlets around the region. "Infidels are subjecting the Muslim world to atrocities — mosques and madrassas are being targeted; even children of four to six months of age are not spared," they claimed. The statement painted a picture that simply did not occur, and reveals some of the effort on the part of the Taliban to exaggerate the details of these strikes to engender more anger and outrage. In this strike, neither a mosque had been targeted nor were women and children killed. In fact, by numerous accounts of eyewitnesses and families as well as security officials who GlobalPost has interviewed, no civilians were killed. This was a far more precise strike than the March 2011 attack. According to one informed, local observer in Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, many drone strikes have been very effective in targeting the leadership of Taliban in the area. The pamphlet also included the name of another top commander, Haleemullah, involved in numerous attacks against Western and Afghan forces across the border. Muhammad Alam was alerted to the news of the March 11, 2012 drone strike in his hometown. Alam, a shopkeeper, had just opened his shop and was waiting for his first customer but instead found his brother with the aforementioned pamphlet from the Taliban announcing the death of three of their top commanders. “All three were very important and had large groups who used to go across the border and attack the American forces”, said Alam, who had heard about their deaths before but saw the Taliban pamphlet as confirmation that they were indeed Taliban leaders. “The drones have really weakened the Taliban and will take some time for them to replace experienced commanders like those killed,” Alam added. The March 2011 and March 2012 strikes are polarized examples of the complex reality of drone attacks. The approximately 350 drone strikes that have taken place in Pakistan since 2008 range in their circumstances and outcomes. These two strikes fall on opposite ends of the drone strike spectrum (in terms of their effects), which ranges from precise targeted killings to broader based and less discriminate signature strikes. In the case of Waziristan, signature drone strikes are especially complicated. It is too often difficult to separate the combatants from the civilians as happened in the case of March 17. Waziristan has been under the control of the Pakistani Taliban for several years now and the local population, in the absence of effective civil administration, rely on the Taliban from duties ranging from policing to dispensing justice. The jirga strike is an example: the two tribes initially approached the Taliban to resolve the mining dispute, who then deferred to the tribal elders to hold a meeting. The tribal administration structure, which has been in place since the 19th century British colonial rule, has now almost collapsed and the Taliban have replaced the traditional leadership in the area. Although their exercises of power include civil quasi-governance, their enforcement is frequently marked by violent volatility and tyranny. Once recently local Taliban leaders even went to the main Press Club in Miran Shah and locked down the building as they were unhappy with a published article. The very fact that the March 2011 jirga was being attended by the Taliban, the local elders and government employees would seem to illustrate their power. The Taliban had sanctioned and convened the jirga and the locals knew that the Taliban would make sure that its decision was obeyed by both the parties. A signature strike such as this serves to confirm the intimacy in governing that exists between the tribal populations and the Taliban who cohabit Waziristan. In such an instance, even minor US intelligence mistakes can have catastrophic consequences in the form of deaths of people perceived as civilians and civilian leaders which serves to enrage the tribal population, perhaps tilting the balance of the “lesser of two evils,” from their delicate perspective, in favor of the Taliban and against the United States. In other words, drone strikes are not 'one size fits all.' The US has a choice as to what circumstances warrant a strike as a matter of policy — essentially a choice between precise strikes and ‘signature strikes,’ and clearly it puts its own foreign policy goals at grave risk in using the ‘signature strikes.’ As the CIA continues to rely on drones in what they deem an armed conflict, it will have a chance to kill highly valued targets as it did in the South Waziristan strike. But to do so it will need to step up its intelligence efforts and embrace the complexity of such operations and weigh the killing of civilians very carefully. The broader attacks like the one in North Waziristan are dangerously crude in their targeting and by killing so many civilians they run the risk of alienating the US even further from Pakistan . The US by not acknowledging the signature strikes due to legal reasons have already lost the narrative to the anti-drone groups of politicians and activists in the US and in Pakistan. ”The fear is that such attacks (like the March 2011 strike in North Waziristan) will bring the left in Europe and the US to join hands with the right in Pakistan resulting in the further radicalization of the Pakistani society,” observed Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. American and Pakistani security officials confirm that the drone attacks have been effective in Pakistan. But the risks associated with error and the deaths of civilians can serve to derail the wider strategy. These indiscriminate attacks too often serve to enrage the general population and to inspire the enemy in a region where the United States can not afford any more enemies.

#### Low value targeting undermines the counterinsurgency doctrine- key to prevent radicalization

Hudson et al 13 Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts (SISMEC). Colin Owens and Matt Flannes are graduate students in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies and the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. Both work as research associates for the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts (SISMEC). “Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War,” <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war>, DOA: 7-18-13, y2k

3. U.S. COMPLICATIONS Strategic Confusion In Afghanistan, the U.S. military is using newly codified counterinsurgency doctrine distilled from Iraq. It focuses on diminishing the political, social and economic conditions that create and bolster the armed resistance seen as insurgency. The rules governing the use of force in U.S. counterinsurgency theory have been designed to reduce deaths generally and thus prevent creating new insurgents.22 This type of strategy was long sidelined in favor of a counterterrorism policy targeting militants. However, the U.S. military has been forced to acknowledge the centrality of this strategy in stabilizing Iraq, as indicated by the massive decrease in civilian and coalition casualties. Ironically, the initial success of drone killings in disrupting strategic organizations has bred its own downfall. The further down the militant hierarchy drone strikes aim and hit, the fewer the high-value targets and the less critical the disruption to the organization. On the other hand, due to counterinsurgency policy across the border in Afghanistan — which relies on "hearts and minds" and troops living on the ground side by side with civilians — the damage to the high-cost campaign is even more palpable. The strategic disconnect between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is only exacerbated by the remote-control nature of the covert drone program, which allows the U.S. public to turn a blind eye. Drone strikes, launched from bases within Pakistan but directed from sites as far away as the American Southwest, are popular with their proponents for several reasons. They are cheaper, less risky to U.S. personnel and easy to run with minimal accountability.23 The same lack of accountability that makes them a favorite of covert intelligence programs disguises the long-term and local effects of regularly, but unpredictably, unleashing violence from the skies. However, if and when a high-value target is killed, the death is celebrated in Western media. The first example of this was Harethi's death in 2002, which has been followed by a handful of successful attacks, such as the alleged but unproven killing of Ilyas al-Kashmiri in 2011. Debate over the drone program continues within the U.S. policy and strategic community. The CIA wants to continue its mission in Pakistan unabated; the Department of State and the Pentagon would like more restrictions on the program. No one is willing to argue that the program needs be cut completely, but many within State and the Pentagon believe that the current pace of drone strikes risks destabilizing a nuclear-armed ally and makes the task of U.S. diplomats more difficult.24

#### Low level strikes increase tensions with Pakistan- disrupts relationships

Foust 12 Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. He is also a member of the Young Atlanticist Working Group. MORE Joshua's research focuses on the role of market-oriented development strategies in post-conflict environments, and on the development of metrics in understanding national security policy. He has written on strategic design for humanitarian interventions, decision-making in counterinsurgency, and the intelligence community's place in the national security discussion. Previous to joining ASP, Joshua worked for the U.S. intelligence community, where he focused on studying the non-militant socio-cultural environment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Army Human Terrain System, then the socio-cultural dynamics of irregular warfare movements at the National Ground Intelligence Center, and later on political violence in Yemen for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Joshua is a columnist for PBS Need to Know, and blogs about Central and South Asia at the influential blog Registan.net. A frequent commentator for American and global media, Joshua appears regularly on BBC World, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor, "U.S. Drones Make Peace With Pakistan Less Likely," 7-12-12, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/us-drones-make-peace-with-pakistan-less-likely/259756/ DOA: 7-20-13, y2k

Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. Sherry Rehman recently made an unsurprising statement. She said that her government has not approved any drones strikes. "It hasn't okayed any American drone strikes on its territory in exchange for Washington's apology over the Salala attacks," she said in an interview with CNN.Rehman argued that there are more effective ways to go after terrorists inside Pakistan, and that the Pakistani government officially condemns "unilateral" drone strikes on its territory. The word "unilateral" here is important, because the Pakistani government collaborates with the U.S. on at least some drone strikes. It varies by target, but the Pakistani government is seeking greater control over target selection and intelligence gathering -- and not necessarily an end to the drone strikes. After all, the Pakistani government is fighting terrorists as well. There is a surprisingly simple explanation for this seeming contrast between public statements by officials and what happens behind the scenes. Pakistani authorities don't mind it when U.S. drones kill off people like the TTP (Pakistani Taliban) leader Baitullah Mehsud. They do, however, mind when U.S. drone strikes happen without their consent or involvement, such as one in North Waziristan in May of this year. (There is a chance, too, that the Pakistani officials protested the North Waziristan strike because that is where Jalaluddin Haqqani, an Taliban-linked insurgent commander widely believed to be supported by Pakistani intelligence, lives) Speaking with CNN, Rehman emphasized the problem of so-called "signature strikes," in which a drone is used to attack a group of unidentified people judged as behaving suspiciously. Like many people, she's uncomfortable with a foreign power killing her country's citizens without knowing who they are or what they're doing. The issue of drones in Pakistan is terribly complex. Pakistanis seem, simultaneously, to love and hate them: love, because drones are responsible for killing many of the terrorists who have brutalized communities across the northwest; hate, because they kill innocent people and because it's humiliating to grant America the right to bomb your country. In recent years, U.S. intelligence services have built up the ability to target the destroy targets in Pakistan without involving the Pakistanis, and that has rankled many in the Pakistani government and security services. At the same time, opportunistic politicians like Imran Khan have taken the hurt pride at having America bomb the country and morphed it into outrage at America -- a worrying development if left unchecked. Untangling the many feelings Pakistanis have about drones, then, is not easy. As Reuters reporter Myra MacDonald has noted quite eloquently, many of the voices most essential to understanding the effects of drones -- the residents of the tribal areas themselves -- are deliberately marginalized by opportunists in support of and in opposition to drones. A recent Pew global poll suggests there is global opposition to the U.S drone campaign. More worryingly, however, is the decrease it shows in Pakistanis' perceptions of the U.S.: 19 percent favorable under President Bush in 2008, but only 12 percent favorable under President Obama in 2012. Whatever the cause, the U.S. is losing the war of perception in Pakistan. It's not clear what can be done to stem America's unpopularity. Policymakers don't seem to think they have many options outside using drones to identify and kill suspected terrorists. While Rehman says she thinks that there are other ways to go after terrorists -- she wasn't clear on specifics -- Washington still seems to consider drones the least-bad way to kill bad guys. One way to think about stemming American unpopularity is to change the terms on which the U.S. relates to Pakistan. Despite last week's apology and reopening of supply lines, relations between the two countries remain tense.The prospects for a close alliance don't seem likely, but the U.S. could help deescalate tensions in part by doing more to consider Pakistan's national pride. Including Pakistani officials in the targeting process more often could be one way of building trust -- though U.S. officials often warn that this can make plans for a drone strike more likely to leak, allowing the target to get away. So it's not clear that a mutually beneficial balance could really be struck. Another way to deescalate tensions might be to focus down the drone program to only high value targets such as al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri, ending strikes against low level (or unidentified) targets, likely allaying some Pakistani objections to the program while still preserving freedom of action against really important threats. Winding down the war in Afghanistan would also remove a major irritant to the Pakistani relationship. A rally by the Islamist group Difah-e-Pakistan Council, or Defense of Pakistan Council, shut down Islamabad on Tuesday. They were protesting the reopening of NATO supply lines into Afghanistan. While not large in the grand scheme of things -- 8,000 people isn't exactly a mass movement in a country of 177 million -- the protests do show that a number of Pakistanis oppose the war. Following through on Obama's plan to end major combat operations by 2014 might further ease the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and allow a bit more leeway in how the it proceeds. With a bit of luck, come 2014, that might be enough to keep things mostly under control.

## T

### Overview

## 2nc precision

#### Sig strikes are distinct from targeted killing- precise and limiting definitions are key to topic education

**Uebersax ‘12** [John Uebersax is a former RAND military analyst, psychologist, and writer, “The Four Kinds of Drone Strikes,” 5-23-12, <http://satyagraha.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/the-four-kinds-of-drone-strikes/>]

We must begin with clear terms, and that is the purpose of the present article. Drone strikes, that is, the launching of explosive missiles from a remotely operated aerial vehicle, come in four varieties: targeted killings, signature strikes, overt combat operations, and covert combat operations. We shall consider each in turn.¶ Targeted killing. This occurs when a drone strike is used to kill a terrorist whose identity is known, and whose name has been placed on a hit list, due to being deemed a ‘direct and immediate threat’ to US security. The government would like people to think this means these strikes target a terrorist literally with his or her hand on a detonator. But, in actuality, the only real criterion is that the government believes the target is sufficiently closely affiliated with terrorist organizations (e.g., a propagandist or financier) to justify assassination. This is likely the rarest form of drone strike. However it receives the most publicity, because the government likes to crow when it kills a high-ranking terrorist.¶ Signature strikes. In signature strikes, the target is a person whose name is not known, but whose actions fit the profile (or ‘signature’) of a high-ranking terrorist. There is some ambiguity concerning the meaning of this term. Some use it in the sense just stated — i.e., a strike against an anonymous terrorist leader. Others use it more broadly to include killing of any non-identified militants, whether high-ranking or not. However from the moral standpoint it makes a major difference whether an anonymous targeted victim is a high-level leader, or simply an anonymous combatant. For this reason it is advantageous to restrict the term “signature strike” to the targeting of anonymous high-level leaders, and to assign strikes against anonymous non-leaders to the two further categories below. Overt combat operation. This category includes drone strikes conducted as part of regular military operations. These strikes are presumably run by uniformed military personnel according to codes of military conduct, and are, logically and legally, not much different from ordinary air or artillery strikes. As a part of routine warfare, such strikes are subject to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Three items of the Geneva Conventions are of special interest here: (1) strikes should occur only in the context of a legally declared war; (2) they should be conducted by lawful combatants (which, many experts believe, excludes use of non-uniformed, civilian contractor operators); and (3) standard provisions concerning the need to report casualties, especially civilian casualties, are in effect.¶ Covert combat operation. Finally, there are covert combat operations. These, like the former category, are launched against usual military targets – e.g., any hostile militant, not just high-ranking ones. But why should these strikes be covert? The obvious answer is: to mask something shady. Covert combat strikes can evade all those irritating constraints on military tactics imposed by the Geneva Conventions, International Law, public opinion, and basic human decency.¶ The specific terms used above to distinguish these four kinds of strikes are admittedly arbitrary, and perhaps some other nomenclature would be more advantageous. But we need some fixed set of terms to refer to these fundamentally different kinds of strikes. Without such terms, the US government will continue to have its way by relying on public confusion and terminological sophistry. For example, if there is only a single generic term, the government may issue a claim such as “drone strikes comply with international law.” This is perhaps technically true for, say, overt military drone strikes, but it is not true for signature strikes. With more precise terms, it would be more difficult for the government to mislead the public.

# Da

## 2NC – Uq

#### V Despite tensions in the Middle East US-Saudi ties are high now

Katsulis 9/26/13 (Brian, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, US-Saudi Ties Tested By Middle East Upheavel")

During the past decade, U.S.-Saudi ties became more complicated as the overall geopolitical environment and regional dynamics witnessed more multipolar competition and the emergence of new transnational threats. The 9/11 attacks produced new questions in some quarters of the United States about Saudi Arabia’s links to terrorist networks. The 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath contributed to the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East, heightening Saudi Arabia’s sense of insecurity and raising new questions among Saudis about the overall U.S. strategy for the region. The Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda” of attempting to support democratic transitions in the Middle East raised further suspicions among Saudi leaders. Also, the Arab Peace Initiative, a proposal with parameters for ending the Arab-Israeli conflict led by Saudi Arabia and first introduced in 2002, gained no traction, and the unresolved conflict remained a source of Saudi complaints in the bilateral relationship. Despite these tensions, the United States and Saudi Arabia forged closer ties in cracking down on the al-Qaida network from Afghanistan to Yemen, and they worked to continue to contain Iranian influence.  The 2011 uprisings in the Arab world have opened the door to a new phase of an intense, multipolar competition for influence among countries in the region, impacting America’s role and how it is viewed. Saudi Arabia, like most countries in the Middle East, [has been forced to respond and adapt](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12988/qatar-saudi-arabia-diverge-in-battle-to-shape-changing-middle-east) more quickly in its foreign policy than it had before. The February 2011 ouster of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak led to vocal Saudi criticisms that the United States was not standing by its close partners. [Bahrain’s crackdown on its own domestic opposition](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8215/world-citizen-saudi-arabia-and-iran-face-off-in-bahrain), with clear backing from Saudi Arabia, drew criticisms from the United States.   Despite these divergent views on some regional issues, the United States and Saudi Arabia worked closely on implementing a political transition in Yemen. They also continued to enhance their counterterrorism cooperation, with the United States reportedly setting up a drone base in Saudi Arabia to enhance its operations against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. The two countries also boosted their military cooperation, with U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia reaching new levels, including more than $30 billion in sales in 2010 alone

#### US-Saudi relations are high now – counter terrorism cooperation is the leading issue that creates cooperation

Boucek 11 (Christopher, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Christopher, "Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia")

This is one of the better relationships in the world on counterterrorism. The cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is strong and on the issue of terrorism the Saudis and Americans basically see eye to eye. There is also a regular exchange of information to help both countries prevent attacks.   This was not the case for the first few years after 9/11, as Saudi Arabia did not fully appreciate the problem. But when violence started in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the relationship with the United States on terrorism improved markedly and quickly grew strong. Now there are programs to improve the security of Saudi’s energy infrastructure, training, officials share databases, photos, fingerprints, etc., and there is a great deal of cooperation on Yemen where there are Saudis hiding out and operating with AQAP.   The relationship today shows how two governments can cooperate. If every country was willing to cooperate like Saudi Arabia, the world would be a much safer place. There are two things that are needed to fight terrorism—political will and capacity. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated both. Other countries haven’t. Saudi Arabia recognized that it was at risk of terrorism and then focused a great deal of attention on the problem.

## Link

#### The plan would fracture a delicate alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia - Drone warfare is central to the legitimacy of the Saudi regime - the plan sparks fear of instability and uncertainty

#### The Saudis don’t want unilateral US action- they think it’s worse for their own security

**Barrett ‘11** [Roby, senior fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department, “Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context,” JSOU Report 11-3, The JSOU Press, 2011, <https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU11-3barrettYemen_final.pdf>]

Once again no matter the temptation, any involvement would acquire a selfgenerating momentum and rationalization of its own, the only truly U.S. strategic interest in Yemen is the security of Saudi Arabia and the oil supplies of the West. The Sunni jihadists in Yemen and their collaboration with others in the region are a tactical not a strategic threat to the West. The real issue is the seriousness of the threat that they represent to Saudi Arabia. No one would care about a dispute between Zaydi Huthis and Zaydi-dominated government in Sana’a if not for Saudi Arabia. The coming water shortage in Yemen and its accompanying humanitarian crisis would have little or no impact, as in Ethiopian and Sudan, on U.S. strategic interests in the region if not for the proximity of the Kingdom. Pirates in the Arabian Sea are an aggravation but not a strategic threat. Many Saudis are convinced that any unilateral U.S. involvement in Yemen—given Iraq, Afghanistan, and support for Israel—has more of a detrimental than a beneficial effect on the Kingdom’s security. The Middle East has a decided no-confidence vote in the U.S. ability to be a positiveindependent player; they also have the strong feeling the U.S. is fixated on what is now the lesser threat of Al Qaeda when the real threat is Iran. 24 If the U.S. is to be effective in southern Arabia, it must pursue focused policies in which the stability and survival of the Kingdom are paramount. This focus does not mean that Saudis dictate all the priorities; to the contrary as Prince Turki bin Feisal bin Abd-al-Aziz once said when talking about Saudi criticism of the U.S. in Iraq, “Real friends sometimes have to say things that their friends do not want to hear.” 246 In addition, sometimes friends have to take actions that other friends do not approve of; however, in Yemen disconnects in Saudi-U.S. policy are a very serious matter. Independent action should only be taken after very careful consideration of the consequences and potential collateral damage to other more strategic interests.

A. Our drone policy is centered around protecting Saudi security – they make all of the drone targeting decisions

LarouchePac 2/9/13 ("Brennan's Lies About US-Saudi Drone Attacks on Yemen Exposed")

Of all the theaters in which the Obama Administration is conducting drone strikes, Yemen seems to be John Brennan's favorite. And no wonder: earlier this week, when it was reported that the U.S. drone strikes in Yemen are launched from a U.S. base in neighboring Saudi Arabia, the Washington Post also reported that Brennan, a former CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia, had played a key role in negotiations with the Saudi government over the base, which was set up two years ago. And it seems clear that the Saudis also play a key role in targeting decisions, since most of those targeted pose much more a threat to the Saudi and Yemeni regimes, than to the United States.

#### The plan is a thinly veiled threat to the regime – going against Saudi will in Yemen is viewed as a challenge

Terrill 11 (Dr. W. Andrew, Strategic studies Institute, Jan 2011"The Conflicts in Yemen and US National Security")

A key country that must be considered in formulating Yemen policy is Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is Yemen’s chief aid donor and often considers itself to have a special relationship with Yemen that affords it an elevated and privileged role in providing external guidance to Sana’a. Some observers suggest that Saudi Arabia views this role as so important that challenging Saudi interests in Yemen is sometimes viewed as equally offensive as interfering in Saudi domestic politics. Riyadh has become especially sensitive about Yemen issues in recent years and even intervened militarily on the side of the Yemeni government in the most recent phase of the Houthi war in Sa’ada province. The Saudis are also deeply involved with Yemen in the struggle against al-Qaeda due in part to a 2009 merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of this organization. The merger occurred following the decision of Saudi al-Qaeda members to flee to Yemen to rebuild their battered organization. Saudi Arabia’s special relationship with Yemen can both help and hinder U.S. objectives for that country.

## Impact

#### Causes cascade proliferation and miscalculation that quickly goes nuclear- it’s the quickest and most probable impact

**Russell ‘09** [James A., Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf]

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Turns the case-

#### Cooperation is key to solve terrorism- Saudis have unique intel

**Murphy ‘10** [Caryle, Saudi Arabia correspondent for GlobalPost, long-time reporter for the Washington Post, Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting and the George Polk Award for Foreign Reporting for coverage of the Persian Gulf War, “Saudi Arabia changes game in terror fight,” 11-6 [www.globalpost.com/dispatch/saudi-arabia/101105/saudi-arabia-yemen-al-qaeda-bomb-plot](http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/saudi-arabia/101105/saudi-arabia-yemen-al-qaeda-bomb-plot)]

In 2007, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz publicly lamented that “no action was taken” on a tip about terrorist plots that his government had passed to London before the horrific 2005 attacks on its public transport system, which left 52 people dead. Three years later, the king can make no such complaints. When Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Muhammad bin Nayef recently called White House counterterrorism chief John O. Brennan to tell him that Al Qaeda’s most industrious affiliate had express-mailed bombs to the United States, the U.S. intelligence community swung into high gear to locate the packages. The different responses highlight major developments that bode well for the international effort to isolate and disrupt Al Qaeda-like terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based group which on Friday said it had mailed the bombs, and which is widely considered one of the most dangerous Al Qaeda branches. The first change has been big improvements in Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism capabilities, resulting in more accurate inside information about extremist Islamic networks. Unlike the information that Riyadh passed to London, which British intelligence officials at the time said was not relevant to the 2005 attacks, the news conveyed to Brennan by Prince Muhammad was precise and detailed. According to media reports, it included tracking numbers on the packages which were addressed to Chicago locations. “The most important point here is that the Saudis have been a major asset in counterterrorism warnings in the last two months,” said Theodore Karasik, director of research and development at the Dubai-based Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis. “It appears that the information they’re getting recently is extraordinarily accurate.” French officials last month praised Riyadh for alerting them to potential terrorist attacks in Europe, specifically in France. Saudi Arabia’s improved intelligence on AQAP in Yemen, which shares a rugged, mountainous border with Saudi Arabia, appears to result not only from increased electronic surveillance of the organization, but also from more successful infiltration by Saudi spies, experts said. “There’s been an incredible investment of U.S. time and expertise in helping the Saudis develop their intelligence capabilities,” said Jarret Brachman, author of “Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice.” “They’ve really come a long way ... and have developed an independent capability … that’s moved much more into human intelligence collection.” Thomas Hegghammer, author of “Jihad in Saudi Arabia,” said that “the fact that the Saudis are helping [with intelligence tips] is not new. They have done so for a long time. What’s new and interesting is that they seem to have infiltrated the organization on some level. And that’s very rare. Al Qaeda is notoriously hard to infiltrate.” In the past, added Hegghammer, a research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, the Saudis “relied mainly on signals intelligence and tips from the public.” Press reports quoting unnamed Yemeni security officials have said that crucial information, which led to uncovering the potentially disastrous cargo bomb scheme, came from a Saudi militant who recently abandoned AQAP in Yemen and surrendered to Saudi officials. The return last month of Jabir Al Fayfi, 35, a former detainee at Guantanamo, was portrayed by Saudi officials as the decision of a man who realized he had made a mistake. They said he had called officials he met while in a Saudi program to rehabilitate extremists and asked for their help in giving himself up. If this description of Al Fayfi’s change of heart is accurate, it would boost the prestige of the rehabilitation program, which is a major component of Saudi Arabia’s fight against militants, because it suggests that it can lead to intelligence coups. The program endeavors to wean extremists from their radical mindset and reintegrate them into Saudi society through financial inducements and family pressures. A second major change in recent years has been growing mutual awareness by both Saudi Arabia and Western governments that they share a common enemy— radical Islamist terrorist groups. For groups like AQAP, “Saudi Arabia is the near enemy and the United States is the far enemy, and the two go hand-in-hand,” said Robert Pape, a University of Chicago political science professor and founder of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism. This mutual recognition has led to greater cooperation, added Karasik. “The threat to all of them is the same, so they are able to coordinate or at least appreciate each other’s interest in preventing something catastrophic” being done by groups like AQAP. In AQAP, however, there is something else that makes for greater cooperation between Riyadh and Washington: Both Saudis and Americans hold key jobs in the extremist organization, which also claimed responsibility for training the Nigerian man who tried to blow up an American airliner over Detroit last Christmas Day.

#### And perception of declining relations emboldens Iran

Vallely 11 (Paul E. Vallely - Chairman, Stand up America, July 19, 2011, "Iran Continues to Change the Balance of Power in Middle East," polymontana.com/2011/07/19/iran-continues-to-change-the-balance-of-power-in-middle-east-2/)

Iran’s goal, therefore, is to coerce the major Sunni powers into recognizing an expanded Iranian sphere of influence at a time when U.S. security guarantees in the region are starting to erode. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, dubious of U.S. capabilities and intentions toward Iran, appears to be inching reluctantly toward an accommodation with its Persian adversary and away from the United States.

#### Extinction

Ben-Meir 7 – professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, Alon, UPI, February 6, Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance

That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling **emboldened and unrestrained**, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could **precipitate a catastrophic regional war**. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, **Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration**. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

## Add on

**EU/US relations resilient**

Joyner 11—editor of the Atlantic Council. PhD in pol sci (James, Death of Transatlantic Relationship Wildly Exaggerated, 14 June 2011, www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/death-transatlantic-relationship-wildly-exaggerated)

The blistering farewell speech to NATO by U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates warning of a "dim, if not dismal" future for the Alliance drew the Western public's attention to a longstanding debate about the state of the transatlantic relationship. With prominent commenters voicing concern about much more than just a two-tiered defensive alliance, questioning whether the U.S.-Europe relationship itself is past its prime, doubts that the Western alliance that has dominated the post-Cold War world are reaching a new high.¶ But those fears are overblown, and may be mistaking short-term bumps in the relationship for proof of a long-term decline that isn't there. Gates' frustration with the fact that only five of the 28 NATO allies are living up to their commitment to devote 2 percent of GDP to defense, which has hindered their ability to take on even the likes of Muammar Qaddafi's puny force without American assistance is certainly legitimate and worrying.¶ Though the U.S.-Europe partnership may not be living up to its potential, it is not worthless, and that relationship continues to be one of the strongest and most important in the world. Gates is an Atlanticist whose speech was, as he put it, "in the spirit of solidarity and friendship, with the understanding that true friends occasionally must speak bluntly with one another for the sake of those greater interests and values that bind us together." He wants the Europeans, Germany in particular, to understand what a tragedy it would be if NATO were to go away.¶ Most Europeans don't see their security as being in jeopardy and political leaders are hard pressed to divert scarce resources away from social spending -- especially in the current economic climate -- a dynamic that has weakened NATO but, despite fears to the contrary, not the greater Transatlantic partnership.¶It would obviously have been a great relief to the U.S. if European governments had shouldered more of the burden in Afghanistan. This disparity, which has only increased as the war has dragged on and the European economies suffered, is driving both Gates' warning and broader fears about the declining relationship. But it was our fight, not theirs; they were there, in most cases against the strong wishes of the people who elected them to office, because we asked. We'd have fought it exactly the same way in their absence. In that light, every European and Canadian soldier was a bonus.¶ Libya, however, is a different story. The Obama administration clearly had limited interest in entering that fight - Gates himself warned against it -- and our involvement is due in part to coaxing by our French and British allies. The hope was to take the lead in the early days, providing "unique assets" at America's disposal, and then turn the fight over to the Europeans. But, as Gates' predecessor noted not long after the ill-fated 2003 invasion of Iraq, you go to war with the army you have, not the one you wish you had.¶ The diminished capabilities of European militaries, spent by nearly a decade in Afghanistan, should be of no surprise. NATO entered into Libya with no real plan for an end game beyond hoping the rebels would somehow win or that Qaddafi would somehow fall. That failure, to be fair, is a collective responsibility, not the fault of European militaries alone.¶ But the concern goes deeper than different defensive priorities. Many Europeans worry that the United States takes the relationship for granted, and that the Obama administration in particular puts a much higher priority on the Pacific and on the emerging BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies.¶ New York Times columist Roger Cohen recently wrote that this is as it should be: "In so far as the United States is interested in Europe it is interested in what can be done together in the rest of the world." In Der Spiegel, Roland Nelles and Gregor Peter Schmitz lamented, "we live in a G-20 world instead of one led by a G-2."¶ It's certainly true that, if it ever existed, the Unipolar Moment that Charles Krauthammer and others saw in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse is over. But that multipolar dynamic actually makes transatlantic cooperation more, not less, important. A hegemon needs much less help than one of many great powers, even if it remains the biggest.¶ Take the G-20. Seven of the members are NATO Allies: the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and Turkey. Toss in the EU, and you have 40 percent of the delegation. If they can form a united front at G-20 summits, they are much more powerful than if each stands alone. Add in four NATO Partner countries (Russia, Japan, Australia, and South Korea) and you're up to 60 percent of the delegation -- a comfortable majority for the U.S.-European partnership and its circle of closest allies.¶ Granted, it's unlikely that we'll achieve consensus among all 12 states on any one issue, let alone most issues. But constantly working together toward shared goals and values expands a sense of commonality.¶ And, like so many things, projects end. Indeed, that's generally the goal. The transatlantic military alliance that formed to defeat fascism remained intact after victory; indeed, it expanded to include its former German and Italian adversaries. NATO outlasted the demise of its raison d'être, the Soviet threat, and went on to fight together --along with many of its former adversaries -- in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. Is there seriously any doubt that other challenges will emerge in the future in which the Americans and its European allies might benefit from working together?

## Solvo

### 2NC – circumvention

#### Obama ignores restrictions- tons of loopholes

**Kumar 3-19**-13 [Anita, White House correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, former writer for The Washington Post, covering Virginia politics and government, and spent a decade at the St. Petersburg Times, writing about local, state and federal government both in Florida and Washington, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants,” <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.Ue18CdK1FSE>]

President Barack Obama came into office four years ago skeptical of pushing the power of the White House to the limit, especially if it appeared to be circumventing Congress.¶ Now, as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his own agenda forward, particularly when a deeply fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way.¶ He’s done it with a package of tools, some of which date to George Washington and some invented in the modern era of an increasingly powerful presidency. And he’s done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, invites criticisms that he’s bypassing the checks and balances of Congress and the courts, and whets the appetite of liberal activists who want him to do even more to advance their goals.¶ While his decision to send drones to kill U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism has garnered a torrent of criticism, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider.¶ He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn’t agree. He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago. He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional. He’s vowed to act on his own if Congress didn’t pass policies to prepare for climate change.¶ Arguably more than any other president in modern history, he’s using executive actions, primarily orders, to bypass or pressure a Congress where the opposition Republicans can block any proposal.¶ “It’s gridlocked and dysfunctional. The place is a mess,” said Rena Steinzor, a law professor at the University of Maryland. “I think (executive action) is an inevitable tool given what’s happened.”¶ Now that Obama has showed a willingness to use those tactics, advocacy groups, supporters and even members of Congress are lobbying him to do so more and more.¶ The Center for Progressive Reform, a liberal advocacy group composed of law professors, including Steinzor, has pressed Obama to sign seven executive orders on health, safety and the environment during his second term.¶ Seventy environmental groups wrote a letter urging the president to restrict emissions at existing power plants.¶ Sen. Barbara Mikulski, D-Md., the chairwoman of the Appropriations Committee, sent a letter to the White House asking Obama to ban federal contractors from retaliating against employees who share salary information.¶ Gay rights organizations recently demonstrated in front of the White House to encourage the president to sign an executive order to bar discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity by companies that have federal contracts, eager for Obama to act after nearly two decades of failed attempts to get Congress to pass a similar bill.¶ “It’s ridiculous that we’re having to push this hard for the president to simply pick up a pen,” said Heather Cronk, the managing director of the gay rights group GetEQUAL. “It’s reprehensible that, after signing orders on gun control, cybersecurity and all manner of other topics, the president is still laboring over this decision.”¶ The White House didn’t respond to repeated requests for comment.¶ In January, Obama said he continued to believe that legislation was “sturdier and more stable” than executive actions, but that sometimes they were necessary, such as his January directive for the federal government to research gun violence.¶ “There are certain issues where a judicious use of executive power can move the argument forward or solve problems that are of immediate-enough import that we can’t afford not to do it,” the former constitutional professor told The New Republic magazine.¶ Presidents since George Washington have signed executive orders, an oft-overlooked power not explicitly defined in the Constitution. More than half of all executive orders in the nation’s history – nearly 14,000 – have been issued since 1933.

#### Convergence trends will moot drone restrictions

**Lohmann 1-28**-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

Recently, the CIA and military more frequently undertake targeted killing missions together, and the distinction between CIA- and military-led operations is blurring.¶ This convergence trend may make it difficult to determine whether a given targeted killing is subject to the constraints of the Covert Action Statute or is instead subject only to internal Executive Branch restrictions. Nicholas Schmidle asserts that the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden, which was conducted jointly by the CIA and military, is particularly illustrative of the oversight problems caused by the convergence trend.¶ Likewise, the convergence trend may be harmful because it means the Executive will choose to use the military, rather than the CIA, to conduct targeted killings, such that oversight of its targeting program will take place almost solely within the Executive Branch. This, critics argue, decreases inter-branch accountability and increases the risk of ad hoc decisionmaking. Consequently, Chesney explains, many demand a retooling of the pertinent legal architecture in light of such trends and concerns so as to increase accountability and adherence to the rule of law.

## Norms

#### Drones aren’t special- they don’t change the strategic costs associated with going to war

CNAS 2012 (Center for New American Security) “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race” http://www.cnas.org/time-joseph-singh-drones

States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### No impact to global drone prolif and it’s impossible to solve

Alejandro Sueldo 12, J.D. candidate and Dean’s Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London of the University of London, 4/11/12, “The coming drone arms race,” <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=70B6B991-ECA7-4E5F-BE80-FD8F8A1B5E90>

Of particular concern are the legal and policy challenges posed if other states imitate the U.S. targeted killing program. For Washington is setting a precedent whereby states can send drones, often over sovereign borders, to kill foreigners or their own citizens, who are deemed threats.

Other states may also follow Washington’s example and develop their own criteria to define imminent threats and use drones to counter them.

Washington will find it increasingly difficult to protest other nations’ targeted killing programs — particularly when the United States has helped define this lethal practice. U.S. opposition will prove especially difficult when other states justify targeted killings as a matter of domestic affairs.

Should enough states follow the U.S. example, the practice of preemptively targeting and killing suspected threats may develop into customary international law.

Such a norm, however, which requires consistent state practice arising out of a sense of legal obligation, now looks unlikely. While targeted killing policies are arguably executed by states citing a legal obligation to protect themselves from imminent threats, widespread state practice is still uncommon.

But international law does not forbid drones. And given the lack of an international regime to control drones, state and non-state actors are free to determine their future use.

This lack of international consensus about how to control drones stems from a serious contradiction in incentives. Though drones pose grave challenges, they also offer states lethal and non-lethal capabilities that are of great appeal. Because the potential for drone technology is virtually limitless, states are now unwilling to control how drones evolve.

## No Drone Prolif

#### Drones that risk conflict are unlikely to proliferate

Andrea Gilli and Gilli 9/13 (PhD Candidate, Department of Social and Political Science, European University Institute & Mauro Gilli isPhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University) http://www.academia.edu/4331462/Attack\_of\_the\_Drones\_Should\_We\_Fear\_The\_Proliferation\_of\_Unmanned\_Aerial\_Vehicles

From our analysis, we reach the opposite conclusion. Drones production and employment is significantly more complicated and costly than many claim. Moreprecisely, at the platform level, for three out of the four types of drones weinvestigate, UAVs require specific technical and industrial competences that are long,difficult and expensive to develop and to maintain. Second, drones require someadvanced components and modules that in three out of four cases are expensive ordifficult either to produce or to access: from sensors to engines and munitions. Finally, with the exception of very small drones, UAVs’ military value depends ontheir integration into a broader architecture, what in military jargon is called thebattle-networks: the entire set of satellite, air and ground installations permitting real-time and constant intelligence sharing. However, building and maintaining suchbattle-networks is both expensive and challenging. 10 In sum, the available evidencesuggests that the types of drones casting the most salient military threats are unlikely to spread as quickly and easily as many claim.

### 2NC- Inevitable

#### Extend Etzioni- drone prolif is inevitable and no one models the plan- countries don’t care about US self-restraint and will use whatever weapons are most effective for their military

#### No reverse modeling- norms can’t solve

**Saunders 5-4**-13 [Paul J. Saunders is executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177>]

A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.¶ Based on their actions, it is almost as if Obama administration officials believe that the United States and its allies will have a long-term monopoly on drones. How else can one explain their exuberant confidence in launching drone attacks? However, the administration’s dramatic expansion in drone strikes—and their apparent effectiveness—will only further shorten Washington’s reign as the drone capital of the world by increasing the incentives to others eager to develop, refine or buy the technology.¶ Have Obama administration officials given any thought to what the world might look like when armed drones are more widespread and when Americans or U.S. allies and partners could become targets? To an outsider, there is little evidence of this kind of thinking in the administration’s use of drones.¶ This is a serious problem. According to an unclassified July 2012 report by the Government Accountability Office, at least 76 countries already have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles, known as UAVs or drones; the report also states that “countries of concern” are attempting to acquire advanced UAVs from foreign suppliers as well as seeking illegal access to U.S. technology. And a 2012 special report by the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper indicated that China has 10 or more models, though not all are armed. Other sources identify additional varieties in China. At least 50 countries are trying to build 900 different types of drones, the GAO writes.¶ More generally, the administration’s expanding use of drones is a powerful endorsement of not only the technology, but of the practice of targeted killing as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Having provided this powerful impetus, the United States should not be surprised if others—with differing legal standards and more creative efforts at self-justification—seize upon it once they have the necessary capabilities. According to the GAO, this is already happening—in government-speak, “while only a limited number of countries have fielded lethal or weaponized UAVs, this threat is anticipated to grow.” From this perspective, it is ironic that a president so critical of his predecessor’s unilateralism would practice it himself—particularly in a manner that other governments will find much easier to emulate than the Bush administration’s larger-scale use of force. How does the Obama administration plan to respond if and when China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?

#### Restrictions won’t be modeled- precedent already set

**Jacobson 2-12**-13 [Mark R. Jacobson is a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2009 to 2011, he served with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Column: Key Assumptions About Drones Are Based on Misconceptions,” <http://www.vnews.com/opinion/4393278-95/drones-drone-armed-civilian>]

Armed drones are neither as simple as model airplanes nor as complex as high-performance fighter jets. Of course, a remote-controlled helicopter that you can build in your garage is certainly not as capable as the $26.8 million MQ-9 Reaper, the primary U.S. hunter-killer drone. But drones are much less expensive than fighter aircraft, and in an age of increasing austerity, it is tempting for nations to consider replacing jets with drones. More than 50 countries operate surveillance drones, and armed drones will quickly become standard in military arsenals. The challenge is to consider what international rules, if any, should govern the use of armed drones. The United States is setting the precedent; our approach may define the global rules of engagement. Of course, we cannot expect other nations to adopt the oversight and restrictions we have. What doors are we opening for other nations’ use of drones? What happens when terrorist groups acquire them? The United States must prepare for being the prey, not just the predator.

#### US drone model is irrelevant

**Wittes and Singh ’12** [Benjamin Wittes is a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution where he co-directs the Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Security and Law, specializes in the legal issues surrounding international security and the war on terrorism, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and the Law, Ritika Singh is a research assistant on law and national security issues at the Brookings Institution. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,” 1-11-12, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>]

Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

## China il

#### Chinese drones don’t threaten the US- too unsophisticated

**Zhou ’12** [Dillon, graduate of the International Relations Program at the University of Massachusetts Boston former research assistant at the Cyber Conflict Studies Association in Vienna, VA as a research assistant, primary areas of interests are in US-China Relations, “China Drones Prompt Fears of a Drone Race With the US,” <http://www.policymic.com/articles/19753/china-drones-prompt-fears-of-a-drone-race-with-the-us>]

The U.S. is deeply concerned with the speed of the Chinese drone program and the growing resources being devoted to the program. The main concern, according to the DSB report, is as follows:¶ “The military significance of China’s move into unmanned systems is alarming. [China] has a great deal of technology, seemingly unlimited resources and clearly is leveraging all available information on Western unmanned systems development. China might easily match or outpace U.S. spending on unmanned systems, rapidly close the technology gaps and become a formidable global competitor in unmanned systems.”¶ Basically, the U.S. is afraid that it won't be able to keep up with a China that has invested itself in a intensive government-sponsored effort to compete with the U.S. drone program in terms of technical quality, quantity, and as a export product to clients in the developing world. On a strategic level, the Chinese drones could be the "tipping point" for giving the Chinese the edge in possible future disputes in Asia with the U.S. as it attempts to create regional security as part of its "Asia Pivot."¶ There are several facts that provide some solace to the U.S. as China's drones are far from being a real challenge to the American drone program.¶ First, the Chinese drones are nowhere as sophisticated as U.S. drones in their range and proper hardware for optic systems and motors to power the "dragons." The DSB report notes that the U.S. technical systems are almost unrivaled at present.¶ Second, China lacks the manpower to properly support their new fleet of drones. Whereas the U.S. has been training and honing a large force of UAV pilots, technicians and operation managers for 15 years.¶ Finally, the U.S. drone program is about 20 years ahead of the Chinese program. The current models on show are considered to be prototypes and not finished products. The Chinese also have not had a chance to gain real experience with their drones during real operation.¶ The U.S. shouldn't be alarmed given these facts. Nor should it be overly critical of the Chinese drone program. Scott Shane of The New York Times observes that the U.S. has set the "international norms" for using drones:¶ "If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them."¶ The U.S. needs to take countermeasures against future risks from Chinese drones, but it needs not be overly alarmed or antsy. Clearly, President Obama and the U.S. has a need to work hard to keep the U.S. ahead of the competition from the "dragons" in order to implement the "Asia Pivot" and pursue U.S. interest in a balance of power in the region.

## Must read

#### No China-Japan war- MAD and economics check

**Katz 13**, Richard, Editor of the semiweekly The Oriental Economist Alert and the monthly The Oriental Economist Report, both reports on Japan, “Mutual Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China and Japan,” July/August, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139451/richard-katz/mutual-assured-production?page=show>

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union carefully avoided triggering a nuclear war because of the assumption of “mutual assured destruction”: each knew that any such conflict would mean the obliteration of both countries. Today, even though tensions between China and Japan are rising, an economic version of mutual deterrence is preserving the uneasy status quo between the two sides. Last fall, as the countries escalated their quarrel over an island chain that Japan has controlled for more than a century, many Chinese citizens boycotted Japanese products and took to the streets in anti-Japanese riots. This commotion, at times encouraged by the Chinese government, led the Japanese government to fear that Beijing might exploit Japan’s reliance on China as an export market to squeeze Tokyo into making territorial concessions. Throughout the crisis, Japan has doubted that China would ever try to forcibly seize the islands—barren rocks known in Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands and in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands -- if only because the United States has made it clear that it would come to Japan’s defense. Japanese security experts, however, have suggested that China might try other methods of intimidation, including a prolonged economic boycott. But these fears have not materialized, for one simple reason: China needs to buy Japanese products as much as Japan needs to sell them. Many of the high-tech products assembled in and exported from China, often on behalf of American and European firms, use advanced Japanese-made parts. China could not boycott Japan, let alone precipitate an actual conflict, without stymieing the export-fueled economic miracle that underpins Communist Party rule. For the moment, the combination of economic interdependence and Washington’s commitment to Japan’s defense will likely keep the peace. Still, an accidental clash of armed ships around the islands could lead to an unintended conflict. That is why defense officials from both countries have met with an eye to reducing that particular risk. With no resolution in sight, those who fear an escalation can nonetheless take solace in the fact that China and Japan stand to gain far more from trading than from fighting.

## China

#### Miniscule risk of war – multiple warrants

**Moss 2-10**-2013 (Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009. “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War” http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true) BW

Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers: “Don't be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns.

These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one.And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict.

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan:

1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation

at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.

2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.

**3.** Question marks over **the PLA’s operational effectiveness**. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.

4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all.

**5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention**. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase.

6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).

7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.

In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations.

However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget.

Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch.

In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

## AZB D

**No risk of war in the Caucasus**

**Friedfeld 12** (Alex Friedfeld, “USEUCOM: Rising Tensions in the Caucasus Will Not Lead to War,” [GLOBAL SECURITY MONITOR](http://c4ads.org/latest/) , the blog of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, September 14, 2012, <http://c4ads.org/latest/?p=840>) GANGEEZY

Despite rising tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is unlikely that the conflict will escalate beyond small skirmishes at the Nargorno-Karabakh border. Though Azerbaijan has superior military capabilities, it would find it difficult to overcome Armenia’s control of the high-ground in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory and it lacks the resources necessary to sustain an extended conflict. Yusef Agayev, an Azerbaijani military expert and a veteran of the last war between the two nations, noted that the army could only fight for a month or two as anything beyond that would have to involve the Azerbaijani society. As Agayev [said](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/us-azerbaijan-armenia-conflict-idUSBRE88A0DQ20120911): “I don’t think the society of my country is ready for war.” Without outside assistance, an all-out war would most likely end in a deadly stalemate. Azerbaijan will not start a war it is unlikely to win. The international community is concerned that if fighting does break out, outside forces would get involved and provide assistance. Armenia is currently partaking in a collective security agreement with Russia, and Azerbaijan is participating in a collective security agreement with Turkey, which is a NATO member. However, Russia and NATO have shown little interest in the matter and have not gone beyond issuing public condemnations of Azerbaijan. While Russia currently has a strong relationship with Armenia, it is working on improving its relations with Azerbaijan as well. On September 12, the two nations[inaugurated the Bridge of Azerbaijani-Russian Friendship](http://www.news.az/articles/politics/68054), the latest in a series of attempts by Russia to increase its influence in Baku. For NATO countries like Turkey, Azerbaijan is an important source of energy, and it will not want to do anything that could jeopardize this flow. Several Western oil companies – such as British Petroleum and ExxonMobil – operate in the Azerbaijani oil fields and would be strongly opposed to any act that would damage their holdings. Any conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia could also disrupt the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, each of which is essential to European attempts to reduce dependence on Russian energy. Though the language employed by officials has become increasingly aggressive since the Safarov pardon, it is important to consider the actual actions – or in this case the lack thereof – of the two states. It has been two weeks since the pardon and neither side has taken any steps that would provoke a war. Perhaps most importantly, there has been no military mobilization by either country. Azerbaijan has publicly insisted for months that it is strong enough to take back the contested territory through force, and yet it has given no physical indication that it intends to do so at this time. Despite its rhetoric and unhappiness with the process, Azerbaijan still considers negotiation a viable alternative to armed conflict

# 1nr

### 2NC- Winning War Uniqueness

#### Drones are winning the war for us now – Kerry’s statements

Levine and Karimi 8/2, Adam Levine and Faith Karimi, “Kerry says Pakistan drone strikes to end ‘very soon’,” August 2, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/01/politics/pakistan-drones>

Following talks with the Pakistani government, Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States is making progress in the war on terror, and hopes to end the use of drone strikes "very soon."¶ The secretary of state told a Pakistani television station that President Barack Obama has a "very real timeline" for ending the strikes.¶ He did not provide specifics on the timeline.¶ "We hope it's going to be very, very soon," Kerry said Thursday, according to a transcript provided by the State Department.¶ "I believe that we're on a good track. I think the program will end as we have eliminated most of the threat and continue to eliminate it," Kerry said.¶ He added that the cessation depends on "a number of factors" and that Washington is working on it with the Pakistani government.¶ A State Department statement later addressed Kerry's remarks.¶ "Today, the secretary referenced the changes that we expect to take place in that program over the course of time, but there is no exact timeline to provide," the statement said.¶ However, it said, the goal is to get to a place where threats are eliminated and drones are not needed.¶ "Now, we're all realistic about the fact that there is a threat that remains and that we have to keep up ... the fight in this and other places around the world," Marie Harf, a State Department spokeswoman, said. "So this was in no way indicating a change in policy. It's really been reinforcing things I think we've said for months on this."¶ The United States ramped up strikes in the tribal region in the first few years of Obama's presidency. But the number of strikes in Pakistan has since dropped partly because of al Qaeda's decline in the country and more U.S. focus on threats from al Qaeda groups in other countries, such as Yemen.¶ In May, Obama defended the use of drone strikes as a necessary evil, but one that must be used with more temperance as the United States' security situation evolves.¶ America prefers to capture, interrogate and prosecute terrorists, but there are times when this isn't possible, Obama said in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington.¶ Terrorists intentionally hide in remote locations and putting boots on the ground is often out of the question, he said.¶ However, he urged caution and discipline.¶ "To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance," Obama said at the time. "For the same progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power -- or risk abusing it."¶ Increased oversight is important, but not easy, Obama said.¶ Drone strikes in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have drawn heated opposition in Pakistan because of civilian casualties.¶ The drone strikes have further roiled relations between the two nations, which flared following a 2011 raid by U.S. commandos on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.¶

### 2NC Drones Take out Insurgents

#### Drones can take out Pakistani insurgents

**Walsh 13**, Declan, Irish journalist who has reported for The Independent and The Guardian, and is currently Pakistan Bureau Chief for The New York Times“US Shift Poses Risk to Pakistan,” May 26th, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/world/asia/us-shift-poses-risk-to-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>

Pakistani leaders who have long demanded an American exit from their region may get their wish, but a broader disengagement is also likely to diminish the financing, prestige and political importance Pakistan held as a crucial player in global counterterrorism efforts, and could upset its internal stability. The diminution of the drone campaign may ease a major point of friction between Pakistan and the West, but the tribal belt in northwestern Pakistan, where about 360 drone strikes have landed in the past decade, remains a hotbed of Islamist militancy, largely outside government control. Although many senior leaders of Al Qaeda sheltering there have been felled by C.I.A. missiles, they have been largely replaced by committed Pakistani jihadists with ties that span the border with Afghanistan. With American combat troops leaving Afghanistan in 2014, and the drone campaign already winding down in Pakistan, analysts fear that unless the Pakistani Army can assert itself conclusively, the tribal region could be plunged into deeper chaos. “It’s going to be a lot of trouble,” said Hasan Askari-Rizvi, a Pakistani academic and defense analyst. “If the insurgency increases in Afghanistan, it will spill into Pakistan’s tribal areas, where the Taliban will become very confident.”

### 2NC Sig Strikes=Leadership Decap

#### Sigs kt leadership

**ICG 5-21**-13 [International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 150 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis, “Drones: ¶ Myths and ¶ Reality in ¶ Pakistan,” <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf>]

The threat of drone attacks, and in particular reported signature strikes, has led militants to avoid regrouping or using cell phones and forced a number of their leaders away from FATA and into the urban areas – thus undermining communication and command.128 The torture and often-videotaped murder of suspected spies, mentioned earlier in this report, arguably indicates apprehension within militant networks.129 According to a senior Pakistani journalist who has extensively covered ¶ militancy in FATA, “drones are the only thing militants fear”.130

### 2NC Blowback

#### No blowback:

#### Misrepresented Data- their ev cites studies conducted with anti-drone organizations, and doesn’t assume the behind closed door support that countries are giving the US- that’s Byman

#### Blowback is small- benefits outweigh

**ICG 5-21**-13 [International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 150 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis, “Drones: ¶ Myths and ¶ Reality in ¶ Pakistan,” <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf>]

In debates on the drone issue, the argument is commonly put forward that drones produce more terrorists than they kill: militant groups exploit real and fabricated ¶ accounts of civilian deaths to enlist fresh recruits, including the relatives of drone ¶ strike victims, for jihad against the U.S. and its allies.133 The actual benefit to extremist groups, including in terms of recruitment, appears, however, minimal. A local analyst who has extensively researched security and governance in FATA notes that ¶ while anti-drone rhetoric does draw some converts, “the loss of a Baitullah Mehsud or a Qari Hussain is much more damaging than the recruitment of a few dozen foot soldiers”.134¶ Moreover, militant recruitment is a complex process, achieved more often on economic than ideological grounds. FATA residents often rely on various militant ¶ jihadi and criminal networks for patronage in the absence of a functioning state, civil ¶ society, and traditional tribal structures that have been decimated by militants. Forced recruitment is also common, with households in militant-controlled areas made to ¶ contribute men to the jihad.135 Any voluntary enlistment in response to drone strikes may well be comparatively minimal.

#### Blowback with Pakistan inevitable- other issues

Fair, 12 – Georgetown Security Studies professor

[C. Christine Fair, PhD from the University of Chicago, former RAND senior political scientist, political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and senior research associate with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Karl Kaltenthaler and William J. Miller, “The Drone War: Pakistani Opposition to American Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” 12-23-12, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193354>, accessed 8-27-13, mss]

While the use of armed drones clearly antagonizes segments of Pakistan’s polity, it is only one of several issues causing conflict between Pakistan and the United States. Others include the infamous Raymond Davis affair of early 2011, in which Davis—a CIA contractor—shot and killed two men whom he claimed were menacing him in Lahore. (Pakistan-based journalists suspect that the two men were in the employ of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI.) The ensuing row over Davis’s fate – the United States claimed that he had diplomatic immunity, while Pakistan insisted that he face trial for murder in Pakistan – spawned protests in Lahore and beyond and deepened Pakistanis’ belief that the United States is indifferent to the loss of Pakistani life.8 Just as Washington and Islamabad were getting beyond the Davis-related turbulence, the May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in the Pakistani cantonment town of Abbottabad again rocked the relationship. As both countries struggled to overcome resulting frost in relations, the November 2011 US-NATO attack on a Pakistani military outpost at Salala, which led to the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers, and the U.S. refusal to apologize once more brought the relationship to the breaking point. Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders face mounting pressure to cease active cooperation with United States, including on the drone program.9

### 2NC Blowback- A2 Leaders

#### It’s still just rhetoric- US foreign aid means Pakistan will never reject drones

Nizami, 13 – The Nation correspondent

[Rameeza, "The bare bones of the drones debate," The Nation, 6-20-13, www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/editors-picks/20-Jun-2013/the-bare-bones-of-the-drones-debate, accessed 8-27-13, mss]

Meanwhile, public pressure makes the politicians up their rhetoric, even as they dig a hole for themselves in the process. Campaign promises are made to “shoot them down”. Do it, rules the Peshawar High Court. Simple enough prescription to protect the penetration of airspace without the state’s permission. It could probably even be done. Drones hover for days, at low altitudes and slow speeds, monitoring and tracking, before eventually targeting. When asked whether it was possible, the Air Chief informed an in-camera briefing of Parliament, that it was not difficult to do. So why don’t we take aim? There would be no loss of life; it's an unmanned plane. Why not take one down? To answer, the Air Chief is said to have replied with another question: “Then what?” The consequences have to be understood outside our layman’s native “nuke-‘em-if-you-got-‘em” thinking process. There will be no US Air Force accompanying them into Pakistani airspace. There won’t be a 5th Fleet deployed to Karachi (…we hope). The result will not be in Pakistan facing military action. It will be something we fear much more than that: We’ll have less stuff. Our relationship with the US is quite possibly the most tangibly beneficial one we have, for all the grief it gives us. As detailed in the Pakistan Economic Survey 2012-2013, the United States is our biggest export market (15.1%), followed by the UAE (10.1%), the UK (5.4%) and Germany at (4.1%). Our overwhelming reliance on – and preference for –military equipment is on the US. Our “higher than the Himalayas” friendships in the neighbourhood notwithstanding, qualitatively, American equipment is just better. The real punch in our air force is the fleet of 60-odd American F-16s, not the 50 Chinese JS-17s. Remember the Pressler Amendment? Senator Dana Rohrbacher probably does. With great nostalgia, at that. He may have not have to reminisce about the good ol’ days for long, if Pakistan provides him the opportunity. The Indians would say, “We told you so. Pakistan is protecting terrorist sanctuaries on its soil,” and would begin preparing to enlarge their footprint in Afghanistan, with even less resistance than before. The money would dry up. And it’s not the aid we’re most worried about, it’s everything else. The quarter-to-quarter running of things. All the money we spend is not on things we can buy within Pakistan, and the all the money we earn is not restricted to funds raised from taxation. For all our well-articulated hatred of it, we really can’t even get a foot in the door at the IMF, without a sifarish. It’s not that the consequences are impossible to predict, it’s just that acknowledging them challenges the view of the world that exists only in our heads. Our delusions of grandeur, curiously accompanied by a narrative of intense victimisation, would become impossible to support. As Shuja Nawaz, at the Atlantic Council, puts it, “There’s no will. You’re in bed with them, yet you still complain.” But, if we are to take the Pakistani position at face value, what, if anything can Pakistan really do to stop them?

### 2NC Blowback- A2 Locals

#### No major public backlash

Fair, 12 – Georgetown Security Studies professor

[C. Christine Fair, PhD from the University of Chicago, former RAND senior political scientist, political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and senior research associate with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Karl Kaltenthaler and William J. Miller, “The Drone War: Pakistani Opposition to American Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” 12-23-12, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193354>, accessed 8-27-13, mss]

Yet despite the many sources of strain in U.S.-Pakistan relations, drones are often depicted as the single most significant irritant. This view is buttressed by the belief – which has become a truism in western and even Pakistani media – that not only do most Pakistanis know about the program, they overwhelmingly oppose it. Foes of the drone program also suggest that the strikes help to create more terrorists than they eliminate.10 But the conventional wisdom about Pakistanis’ universal opposition to the drones is not empirically buttressed. Polling data from Pew11 demonstrate that nearly two-thirds of Pakistanis have never even heard of the drone program, despite the media coverage it has received in Pakistan and beyond. Among the minority of respondents (35 percent) who had heard of the program, nearly one third said that drone strikes are necessary to defend Pakistan from extremist groups. A slight majority (56 percent) of the one third who were familiar with drones said that drone strikes are not necessary to protect Pakistan, and nearly one in two (49 percent) Pakistanis who were familiar with the program believe that the strikes are being conducted without their government's approval. Yet this figure is not that much greater than the 33 percent who believe that their government has given its approval for these strikes.12 Clearly, Pakistani public opinion less informed, and much less unanimous, than is often presumed.

### 2NC A2 Kick Out

#### Submerged platforms solves rapid, global access

McDuffee, 13 – Wired defense and national security reporter

[Allen, "DARPA’s Plan to Flood the Sea With Drones, Carrying More Drones," Wired, 9-13-13, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/09/hydra-darpa/, accessed 9-19-13, mss]

DARPA’s Plan to Flood the Sea With Drones, Carrying More Drones

DARPA, the Pentagon’s research agency, has recently revealed its plans to boost the Navy’s response to threats in international waters by developing submerged unmanned platforms that can be deployed at a moment’s notice. Hydra, named after the serpent-like creature with many heads in Greek mythology, would create an undersea network of unmanned payloads and platforms to increase the capability and speed the response to threats like piracy, the rising number of ungoverned states, and sophisticated defenses at a time when the Pentagon is forced to make budget cuts. According to DARPA, the Hydra system ”represents a cost effective way to add undersea capacity that can be tailored to support each mission” that would still allow the Navy to conduct special operations and contingency missions. In other words, the decreasing number of naval vessels can only be in one place at a time. “The climate of budget austerity runs up against an uncertain security environment that includes natural disasters, piracy, ungoverned states, and the proliferation of sophisticated defense technologies,” said Scott Littlefield, DARPA program manager, in a statement. “An unmanned technology infrastructure staged below the oceans’ surface could relieve some of that resource strain and expand military capabilities in this increasingly challenging space.” The Hydra system is intended to be delivered in international waters by ships, submarines or aircraft with the integrative capability of communicating with manned and unmanned platforms for air, surface, and water operations. Unlike the Upward Falling Payloads (UFPs) program DARPA announced in January that would submerge massive waterproof containers intended to store weapons, drones and supplies for years at a time, Hydra is a highly mobile platform that can be deployed for a few weeks or months in relatively shallow international waters. “By separating capabilities from the platforms that deliver them, Hydra would enable naval forces to deliver those capabilities much faster and more cost-effectively whereverneeded,” said Littlefield. “It is envisioned to work across air, underwater, and surface operations, enabling all three to perform their missions better.”

### 2NC – Signature Strikes KT Counter Terror

#### Signature strikes key- behavioral targeting is a pre-req for strikes- this means they make drones ineffective even if they are inevitable

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[Geoffrey, former JAG officer and chief of the law of war branch of the international law division of the US Army, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, "The law of armed conflict, the use of military force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force," Congressional Documents and Publications, 6-16-13, l/n, accessed 8-23-13, mss]

This target validation process obviously involves a complex and at times challenging analysis of a variety of factors that indicate an individual is in fact a belligerent operative of al Qaeda or other enemy forces. Because of the unconventional and dispersed nature of al Qaeda operations, this threat identification process must, by necessity, focus on indicia that are less obvious than those relied on to positively identify enemy belligerent operatives in the context of more conventional inter-state hostilities. It is, however, erroneous to suggest that threat identification, even in the conventional conflict context, is "easy." On the contrary, the intensity and pace of modern warfare make threat identification challenging in any type of armed conflict. It is, however, obvious that the complexity of threat identification is magnified in an armed conflict with an unconventional and highly dispersed enemy belligerent group. It is therefore logical and appropriate to rely on multiple factors to guide threat identification of this enemy. These factors will almost certainly include patterns of activity, association, location, signals and human intelligence indicating activities and intentions, and the nature of the individual's contribution to the belligerent objectives of al Qaeda.

#### Signature intel is strong and effective- key to counter-terror

**Anderson ’13** [Kenneth, professor of international law at American University and a member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary135.6 (Jun 2013): 14-23, Proquest, online]

ARE DRONE TECHNOLOGY AND TARGETED KILLING really so strategically valuable? The answer depends in great part not on drone technology, but on the quality of the intelligence that leads to a particular target in the first place. The drone strike is the final kinetic act in a process of intelligence-gathering and analysis. The success- and it is remarkable success- of the CIA in disrupting al-Qaeda in Pakistan has come about not because of drones alone, but because the CIA managed to establish, over years of effort, its own ground-level, human-intelligence networks that have allowed it to identify targets independent of information fed to it by Pakistan's intelligence services. The quality of drone-targeted killing depends fundamentally on that intelligence, for a drone is not much use unless pointed toward surveillance of a particular village, area, or person.¶ It can be used for a different kind of targeting altogether: against groups of fighters with their weapons on trucks headed toward the Afghan border. But these so-called signature strikes are not, as sometimes represented, a relaxed form of targeted killing in which groups are crudely blown up because nothing is known about individual members. Intelligence assessments are made, including behavioral signatures such as organized groups of men carrying weapons, suggesting strongly that they are "hostile forces" (in the legal meaning of that term in the U.S. military's Standing Rules of Engagement). That is the norm in conventional war.¶ Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.¶ Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.¶ If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counterinsurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.¶ Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Behavior targeting is critical- disrupts networks and key operatives

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To outside observers, some targets such as senior operational leaders are obviously worthy of placement on a kill-list, while the propriety of adding other persons to a kill-list may be more hotly disputed. While it may be clear that killing a bomb-maker (to draw from the example in my last post) is an obvious choice as it can create a gap in an enemy organization that may be hard to fill, removing other individuals (even if they are quickly replaced) may similarly pressure or disrupt terrorist organizations. As CIA director Hayden stated in 2009:¶ By making a safe haven feel less safe, we keep al-Qaeda guessing. We make them doubt their allies; question their methods, their plans, even their priorities… we force them to spend more time and resources on self-preservation, and that distracts them, at least partially and at least for a time, from laying the groundwork for the next attack.¶ When personnel within the targeting process are developing names for kill-lists, they will look beyond the criticality and vulnerability factors (described in my prior post) and will supplement that analysis with network based analysis. Networked based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another. Those nodes and links, once identified will be targeted with the goal of disrupting and degrading their functionality. To effectively pursue a network based approach, bureaucrats rely in part on what is known as “pattern of life analysis” which involves connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life. This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence.” It assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”¶ While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented, built into a network diagram and further analyzed. Through this process links and nodes in the enemy’s network emerge. The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks” identifying key-decision makers and those who support or influence them indirectly. This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests and they will exploit human and signals intelligence. They will feed this information into computer systems that help integrate the knowledge and which generate and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network. “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure…as a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target.”¶ NETWORK BASED ANALYSIS AND THE KILLING OF “FOOT SOLDIERS”¶ Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how seemingly low level individuals such as couriers and other “middle-men” in decentralized networks such as al Qaeda are oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization. Targeting these individuals can “destabilize clandestine networks

by compromising large sections of the organization, distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function.” Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations. Thus, while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer, when considered by an analyst relying on network based analytical techniques, the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an important impact on an enemy organization. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security. This means that social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker, journalist, or even a target’s family members may in fact be strong ties within the network. Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.